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Abstract
Board out of Your Mind: Mapping Players’ Mental Models of Game Systems and Potentials for
Systems-Thinking Instruction
Joe A. Wasserman
Despite evidence that game-based instruction is effective, and suggestive evidence that they are
specifically effective for teaching systems thinking—the ability to think about complex
systems—the mechanisms behind this learning are not well understood. One promising
perspective on game-based learning is rooted in the development of mental models of game
systems. Mental models are cognitive representations of the perceived entities and relationships
between entities in a system. This study explores the entities and entity relationships in novice
players’ mental models of an analog game. Grounded, interpretive analysis of mental models
externalized through cognitive mapping identified five categories of entities: formal game
entities, player actions, sociality, learning processes, and subjective experience. Content analysis
of the relationships among these entities revealed that complex relationships were rarely
identified, as players primarily described simple relationships. The implications of these findings
for a) understandings of the nature of games and gameplay and b) effective game-based
instruction are discussed.
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Introduction
Games have a strong potential for use as instructional tools (Gee, 2003; National
Research Council, 2011) across disciplines as diverse as the humanities (Shapiro, 2013); nursing
(Nehring & Lashley, 2009); science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM); health;
business; and economics (Boyle et al., 2016; Clark, Tanner-Smith, & Killingsworth, 2016).
Although most discussion of game-based instruction has focused on digital games, research on
analog games—which involve face-to-face manipulation of material components and a
communicative orientation (W. J. White, 2012)—suggests that analog games are also effective
instructional tools (e.g., Berland, 2011; Jiménez, Acholonu, & Arena, 2014; Laski & Siegler,
2014). Despite evidence of the learning benefits of playing games, the mechanisms by which this
learning occurs—and the characteristics of games that support this learning—have not yet been
well-established empirically. In other words, it is not yet known how game dynamics are
internalized or how the things that people learn from playing a game are transferred to other
contexts, such as other academic learning activities or applied contexts.
In order to understand how learning from a game can be transferred to other non-game
contexts, it is first necessary to understand what individuals learn from playing games
themselves. This study seeks to advance understandings of how games may function in a
particular type of learning—the development of the ability to think about complex systems—by
framing game-based learning as a process of developing mental models of game systems. As
such, the present study investigates the building blocks of these mental models: what game
elements individuals attend to and find subjectively salient during gameplay. The salience of
game elements to phenomenological experiences of gameplay is crucial, because it is imperative
for using games as instructional tools that learners attend to the parts of the game in which
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instructional objectives are embedded. Furthermore, in order to understand the complexity of
individuals’ mental models of an analog game system, the present study identifies the kinds of
relationships individuals perceived among its constitutive elements. This exploratory study takes
a grounded, interpretive approach to examining the elements learners find salient in a
commercial, off-the-shelf analog game that encompasses key features of complex systems.
Findings suggest that players identify a range of material and immaterial objects, processes, and
assessments; however, the finer complexities of the game system may be difficult for some
players to identify.
Systems Thinking as a Contemporary Skill
Systems thinking, or the ability to think about and understand systems (Lane, 1995), is a
necessary 21st Century skill (National Research Council, 2012) in order to understand and
interact with the systems that pervade everyday life. These systems are ubiquitous and cross
domains. They include biological systems like the transport of ions in a cell or an ecosystem’s
predator-prey dynamics; technological systems like a hospital’s electronic health record’s
interconnected and mutually dependent servers, workstations, software, databases, and users;
organizational systems like the flow of products and documentation through formal hierarchies
and informal channels; and economic systems of producers and consumers. These examples are
far from exhaustive. All of these systems involve a number of things—whether organelles,
computers, or people—that influence, affect, or interact with each other. Because the kinds of
things within systems vary so dramatically (material and immaterial, human and nonhuman,
static and processual), they are referred to here by the generic term “entity.”
Systems thinking has received considerable attention in business management and
organizational studies (Checkland, 1999). In the social sciences, systems thinking is relevant to
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modeling social (Garson, 2009) and social psychological processes (Levine & Doyle, 2002).
Education researchers and policymakers have identified systems thinking as a core competency
for STEM education (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; National Research Council, 2012). Systems
saturate everyday life as well: legal and government systems, economic systems, social systems,
mechanical and electrical systems. Because systems are ubiquitous, the ability to accurately
understand and productively think about them is important for not only STEM and business, but
for engagement with these systems in everyday life.
The ability to accurately identify the entities within a system is a crucial systems thinking
competency, but one that operates at the lowest-level cognitive processes within the well-known
revision to Bloom’s learning typology (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). Indeed, systems thinking
can operate at every level of the revised taxonomy of educational objectives (see Hopper &
Stave, 2008) that includes, from lowest to highest, remembering, understanding, applying,
analyzing, evaluating, and creating (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). At the lowest levels of this
taxonomy, systems thinking involves identifying a system’s components. At higher levels,
systems thinking involves identifying how a system’s entities relate to each other. At yet higher
levels, it involves using those understandings to make predictions about the system or to guide
interactions with the system. At the highest level, systems thinking involves designing and
creating novel systems. Progressing up this taxonomy, these systems thinking competencies
build on each other. This study focuses on the foundational systems thinking competencies of
identifying the entities within a system and how they influence each other.
Challenges to Systems Thinking: System Complexity
Systems thinking and teaching systems thinking competencies are both challenging,
particularly when the systems involved are complex (Sterman, 1994). System complexity has
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two dimensions: the number of parts within the system and the kinds of relationships it contains.
System complexity due to the number of parts within a system is referred to as “detail
complexity,” while system complexity due to the kinds of relationships in a system is referred to
as “dynamic complexity” (Senge, 2006). At its simplest, a system might involve one entity
influencing one other entity. Take for example a car’s accelerator pedal and the whole car: when
the accelerator pedal is pressed, the car accelerates forward. In reality, few systems are this
simple. They involve numerous interrelated entities. Continuing the example of driving a car,
consider the role of the mechanical and electronic systems underlying the operation of the car,
the physiological characteristics of its human operator, the condition of the road, the laws
governing driving, and the economic systems that enabled the car’s production and maintenance.
Depending on the aspect of driving a car at issue, any or all of these may be relevant aspects of
the system. A system with more entities and more interrelationships between those entities has
more detail complexity (Senge, 2006). In other words, detail complexity is the number of entities
and interrelationships in a system. Increased detail complexity makes understanding a system
difficult, because it strains cognitive working memory capacity by requiring individuals to attend
to more bits of information simultaneously (Lang, 2000).
At another level, systems can increase in complexity not because of their size, but
because of the nature of the relationships among entities in the system. When thinking about
systems, individuals often apply heuristics to understand the interrelationships among entities, so
as to preserve cognitive resources (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The heuristics individuals
apply to these relationships frequently misidentify their nature (Sterman, 1994). Typically, these
heuristics treat the relationships in systems as direct, linear, deterministic, and immediate
(Gleick, 1988; Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; Sterman, 1994; Sweeney & Sterman, 2007). In
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contrast, the relationships among entities in a system are often indirect, nonlinear, stochastic, and
delayed. Additionally, combinations of relationships can form feedback loops. These five kinds
of relationships are defined and described below. Collectively, these kinds of relationships that
contribute to a system’s complexity are referred to here as “complex relationships.” To illustrate
the nature of these relationships in an analog game context, examples are drawn from the analog
game Dominion (Vaccarino, 2008), which exemplifies these kinds of relationships. Notably, the
game as a whole is not of interest in this section, merely the relationships among the game’s
components.
Indirect relationships. An indirect relationship is one in which an entity influences
another entity via at least one other. For example, when turning on a gas stove, turning the knob
activates a spark, which ignites gas into flames. Here, the relationship between the knob and gas
is indirect, since it goes through the spark. An example of an indirect relationship in Dominion is
that between treasure cards and victory cards. Although the goal of the game is to acquire victory
point cards, it is not possible to acquire the most valuable victory point cards without first
acquiring more valuable treasure cards and action cards. As such, action cards and other treasure
cards are intermediaries in the relationship between treasure cards and victory point cards. In
other words, treasure cards indirectly influence victory point cards through action cards and other
treasure cards. More generically, an indirect relationship is one in which some entity, A,
influences another entity, D, through at least one other entity, B and C. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of a generic indirect relationship.

Figure 1. Illustration of an indirect relationship between entity A and entity D, in which entity A
influences entity D through entities B and C.
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Nonlinear relationships. Whereas a linear relationship involves a constant proportion of
input to output, nonlinear relationships change depending on the input (Groesser &
Schaffernicht, 2012; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). In other words, the size of the influence of
one entity on another entity depends on the quantity or strength of the influencing entity.
Generically, these relationships are curvilinear, and include exponential and logarithmic
relationships. The relationships between the length of a square’s sides and its surface area are
nonlinear. A square with a 1 inch side has a surface area of 1 in2, while a 2 in square has a
surface area of 4 in2, and a 3 in square has a surface area of 9 in2. As can be seen, the greater the
increase in the length of a square’s side, the more it increases the surface are of the square.
Because this increase increases, the relationship is nonlinear. In Dominion, the relationship
between treasure cards and victory cards is nonlinear: more valuable cards cost more treasure,
but yield an increasingly greater proportion of points to treasure. Specifically, 1-point victory
cards cost 2 treasure (1:2), 3-point victory cards cost 5 treasure (3:5), and 6-point victory cards
cost 8 treasure (3:4). The proportion of points to treasure increases from .5 to .6 to .75. See
Figure 2 for an example of a generic nonlinear relationship.

Figure 2. Illustration of a nonlinear relationship between entity A and entity B, such that the
influence of A on B increases for higher levels of A.
Stochastic relationships. Stochastic relationships are non-deterministic (Resnick &
Wilensky, 1998), because they involve randomness. In other words, the influence of entity A on
entity B is probabilistic. One example of a stochastic relationship is that between air and a dust
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particle. Because air molecules move about in random directions (Kramers, 1940), when they
come into contact with a dust particle, they move that dust particles about in random directions
as well. In a game context, many of the relationships in Dominion are stochastic, since each
player’s deck of cards is randomized by shuffling. How cards can be used to interact with each
other, therefore, involves randomness, as the cards drawn from players’ decks are randomized.
Delayed relationships. Delayed relationships involve a lapse of time in between an event
or an input and its consequences (Groesser & Schaffernicht, 2012; Landriscina, 2013; Sweeney
& Sterman, 2007). In other words, the influence of entity A on entity B does not occur
immediately, but only after some temporal delay. See Figure 3 for an example of a generic
delayed relationship. One example of a delayed relationship is ordering food at a restaurant.
Once a patron orders food, say a hamburger, that hamburger is not available immediately.
Because the hamburger needs to be cooked, there is a time lag between placing an order for food
and receiving that food. In Dominion, the effect of each newly acquired card is delayed, since it
does not come into play until it is shuffled into a deck and then drawn into a player’s hand on a
future turn.

Figure 3. Illustration of a delayed relationship between entity A and entity B, in which there is a
temporal delay in the influence of A on B.
Feedback loops. In combination, the relationships between entities in a system can form
structures called feedback loops (Eden, Ackermann, & Cropper, 1992; Groesser & Schaffernicht,
2012; Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; Landriscina, 2013). In a feedback loop, an entity influences
itself, often through indirect relationships described above. Under ideal conditions, stock market
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investments are a feedback loop. Money invested in stocks leads to more money, which when
reinvested in the stock market, leads to more money. In this way, money comes to act on itself
through stock market investments: money leads to more money. In Dominion, for example,
action cards form a feedback loop, in which playing them allows players to not only draw more
cards, but also play more cards. In this way, action cards influence themselves. This example is a
positive feedback loop, also referred to as a “virtuous” or “vicious” cycle (Eden et al., 1992),
because it is self-reinforcing. In other words, an event or change in one entity (e.g., playing an
action) leads to more of the same (e.g., playing more action cards). Negative, or balancing,
feedback loops involve an event or change in an entity that suppresses more of the same. For
example, in natural populations of predators and prey, when predator populations increase, they
consume more prey, thus decreasing prey populations. Because of the reduced availability of
prey, predator populations decrease, leading to less consumption of prey, and therefore
increasing prey populations. In this way, predator populations and prey populations are involved
in a negative feedback loop with each other. Dominion also contains negative feedback loops.
Victory cards in players’ decks, for example, are part of a negative feedback loop. Because
victory cards added to players’ decks do not allow players to do anything besides score points at
the end of the game, whenever these point cards are drawn, they make it more difficult to play
other cards (e.g., action and treasure cards) and to buy more victory cards. Generically, feedback
loops involve an entity that influences itself, possibly through indirect relationships with other
entities. See Figure 4 for an illustration of a generic feedback loop.

9

Figure 4. Illustration of a feedback loop in which entity A influences itself through entities B and
C.
These complex relationships—indirect relationships, nonlinear relationships, stochastic
relationships, delayed relationships, and feedback loops—all contribute to a system’s dynamic
complexity (Senge, 2006). Following, the definition of systems thinking can be made more
specific, referring to the ability to think about and understand not just simple systems, but
relatively complex systems in particular. Whereas detail complexity is strictly the amount of
things—entities and relationships—in a system, dynamic complexity has to do with the kinds of
relationships between entities. The more feedback loops and the more indirect, nonlinear,
stochastic, or delayed relationships, the greater a system’s dynamic complexity. The more
entities and relationships between entities, the more detail complexity. The processes involved in
learning about complex systems are discussed below.
Learning about Complex Systems as Mental Model Development
It has been suggested that learning about a complex system, both through playing games
and more generally, is a process that involves understanding and forming a cognitive
representation of it (Landriscina, 2013; Sterman, 1994). Based on the perception of, interaction
with, and communication about a system—as well as pre-existing stocks of knowledge and
experience—individuals develop mental models specific to that system (Doyle & Ford, 1998,
1999; Landriscina, 2013; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Dillman Carpentier, 2002).
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The view of mental models of complex systems proposed here is that they are cognitive
representations of systems that include both a) the entities an individual perceives to be part of
that system and b) how those entities related to each other (Doyle & Ford, 1998, 1999; Groesser
& Schaffernicht, 2012; Landriscina, 2013; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). Drawing from the
above discussion of complex relationships, an individual’s mental model of Dominion might
include a number of entities: perhaps several different kinds of cards (e.g., action, treasure, and
victory cards), the people playing the game, and their goal while playing the game (e.g., to get
the most points, to try a new strategy, to have fun). This mental model would also include the
relationships among these entities: perhaps the influence of a specific goal and the behavior of
other players on the types of cards acquired, as well as the interaction of those acquired cards
that facilitate the acquisition of victory cards. In sum, a mental model consists of these entities
and interrelationships.
Like systems themselves, mental models have varying degrees of complexity, which can
again be categorized into two types: detail complexity and dynamic complexity (Senge, 2006). A
mental model’s detail complexity is its number of entities and relationships between entities. A
mental model’s dynamic complexity is the degree to which it contains complex relationships—
the kinds of relationships and structures that are typical of complex systems—described above:
indirect relationships, nonlinear relationships, stochastic relationships, delayed relationships, and
feedback loops. Taken together, these relationships form the total structure of a mental model.
These mental models, once developed, are activated when further engaging with the
complex system (Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Landriscina, 2013). In practice,
individuals use their mental models to make predictions or explanations about the system, as
well as to inform decision-making. This process can be thought of almost as a cognitive
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simulation of a system, in which individuals predict behaviors and outcomes by running
scenarios through their mental models. While playing Dominion, for example, an individual
might activate a mental model of the game to anticipate the effects of acquiring a certain card.
This process can result in modifications to an individual’s mental model of the system
(Landriscina, 2013). An unexpected outcome, for instance, may prompt a revision to better take
into account the observed behavior of the system. Acquiring a victory card, for example, may
make it more difficult than anticipated to acquire further victory cards, thus prompting an
alteration to an individual’s mental model in terms of the relationship between victory cards in
an individual’s deck and the ability to acquire more of the same.
Once these mental models are developed, they can be transferred and applied to other
contexts. Learning transfer can be broken down into two types: direct application and preparation
for future learning (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999). Traditional understandings of learning
transfer, which view transfer as the application of mental models directly to other contexts or
problems, fall under the “Direct Application” theory of transfer (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999).
Direct application transfer involves the application of mental models to problem-solving in other
contexts. For example, individuals might develop a mental model of an analog game about
climate policy (e.g., Castronova & Knowles, 2015). Direct application transfer of this mental
model of the climate policy game to a different context might involve drawing on that mental
model when problem-solving policy issues in another area. Alternatively, the “preparation for
future learning” (PFL) paradigm of learning transfer suggests that pre-existing mental models
support the future development of mental models (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999). In PFL, mental
models are not directly applied to new contexts or problems, but are used as resources in
subsequent learning experiences and to understand new knowledge. For example, PFL transfer
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might involve drawing on a mental model of a climate policy game when reading a text on
global ecological politics. This process might involve relating the interests and proposals of
various governments and interest groups in the text to the relationships between different entities
an individual perceived while playing the climate policy game.
Given that learning about complex systems involves developing mental models that
represent them, it is important to first understand the detail and dynamic complexities—the
entities and relationships—of those mental models. Understanding this mental model content
will provide insight into the potential effectiveness of various instructional tools—including
games—for teaching systems thinking. Understanding mental model content empirically will
improve understandings of mental models, as well as their role in the learning process.
Games for Systems Thinking
It has been suggested that games have a strong potential for learning in general (Gee,
2003) and for training systems thinking competencies specifically (National Research Council,
2011). As described above, the mechanism for learning about complex systems that is proposed
in this study is a process of developing mental models of those complex systems. Despite some
suggestive but indirect empirical evidence, reviewed below, that supports these claims, the
mechanisms by which this learning occurs—and the characteristics of games that support this
learning—have not yet been well-established empirically.
Games as exemplary complex systems. One of the reasons games are thought to be
particularly effective for learning about complex systems is that some games are exemplary
complex systems. Dominion, which has been used above to explain various characteristics of
complex systems, is a prime example. As described above, Dominion’s game system contains
indirect relationships, nonlinear relationships, stochastic relationships, delayed relationships, and
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feedback loops. Because it contains all five of these complex relationships, Dominion’s game
system as a whole is ideal for investigating dynamic complexity. Theoretical and critical-cultural
work on games, including both digital games and analog games, have further explored the notion
of games as systems (Giddings, 2009; Juul, 2011; Ralph & Monu, 2015; Steinkuehler, 2006;
Taylor, 2009). In particular, this work has suggested that game systems contain various kinds of
entities. Echoing one of the central insights of Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2008)—that
human and non-human actors allow and constrain each others’ actions by virtue of their
interrelationships—this scholarship has suggested that games involve the interaction of human
entities like players (e.g., Evans, 2013; Giddings, 2007) and game designers (e.g., Steinkuehler,
2006), conceptual entities like rules (e.g., Evans, 2013; Giddings, 2009; Juul, 2011; Steinkuehler,
2006) and norms (e.g., Steinkuehler, 2006), and material entities like cards and pawns (e.g.,
Leino, 2012b). In theoretical definitions of games, rules describe the meaning of a game’s
material artifacts insofar as they relate to achieving a game’s potential outcomes. They are also
thought to delimit what are possible and not possible actions to take within each game. Game
designers create rules and material game artifacts with players’ actions and interactions in mind
(Robin, Marc, & Robert, 2004). This theoretical work suggests that during gameplay, players
engage a game’s rules and manipulate its material artifacts to achieve their goals (Juul, 2011).
Despite these theoretical suggestions of the entities that comprise games and critical-cultural
analyses of what entities are important during gameplay, attention has not been paid to the
phenomenological experience of gameplay. That is, the entities of a game system that are
subjectively salient to individuals during and after gameplay are unknown. In other words, it is
uncertain both a) which of many potential kinds of entities individuals include in their mental
models of game systems and b) how they conceptualize these entities. Understanding the content
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of mental models of game systems is crucial to understanding what and how games can be used
in an instructional context.
Game-based systems-thinking instruction. Research on learning about systems from
playing games is fairly limited, but existing scholarship does suggest that games can indeed be
effective instructional tools (e.g., Corredor, Gaydos, & Squire, 2013). Furthermore, games seem
to be effective instructional systems thinking tools across ages, from elementary school students
(e.g., Corredor et al., 2013) to undergraduates (e.g., Stave, Beck, & Galvan, 2015). Nevertheless,
most of the studies of game-based systems-thinking instruction provide little evidence for the
learning mechanisms at work or the elements of games that contribute to systems thinking. For
example, fifth grade students who played a digital game and read a text about genetic and
cellular systems were able to identify not only more relationships between entities, but also more
delayed relationships between entities, than students who examined a diagram and read a text
about the same (Corredor et al., 2013). As discussed above, delayed relationships are central to
understanding complex systems. As such, this finding in particular accords with the present
study’s conceptualization of mental models as cognitive representations of entities and their
relationships. In a different context, high school students who played a digital game about
Newtonian physics, which deals with the relationships between objects and forces, improved
their performance on a test of physics understanding more than students who merely took the
same Newtonian physics test twice (B. Y. White, 1984). In terms of a more complex system,
primary school students who played a fish farm digital simulation game scored significantly
higher on two measures of system understanding than students who did non-game hands on
activities about fish farming: diagramming a fish farm system and a problem-solving quiz on
issues that could arise in their fish tank (McVeigh, Black, & Flimlin, 2008). Diagramming a fish
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farm system involved identifying the entities and relationships contained therein, while the
problem-solving quiz involved applying understandings of the overall fish farm system behavior
to novel situations. In two naturalistic studies in which middle-schoolers played the commercial
off-the-shelf digital game RollerCoaster Tycoon 3 (Frontier Developments, 2004), students
improved their scores on a test of economics system understanding (Foster, 2011) and on a more
general systems thinking test (Shah & Foster, 2014).
This learning seems to be effective in older students as well. Among undergraduate
students, running a game-like computer simulations of two different environmental accumulation
scenarios—a) seeds drifting between islands and ocean and b) the accumulation of atmospheric
carbon—more times was associated with greater improvement in test scores on accumulations in
closed systems, even when controlling for accumulation task pre-test scores, graphing
familiarity, interest in the course, and previous science experience (Stave et al., 2015).
Accumulation involves the flow of resources between entities in a system. Also among
undergraduates, students who played a digital simulation game of the economic incentive
structures associated with different governmental organizations better understood these incentive
structures three weeks after learning about them than students who attended a lecture about the
same topic (Nishikawa & Jaeger, 2011). This finding suggests that, in this case, students’
understanding of government and economic systems persisted more over time after playing a
game on the topic than attending a lecture. These studies suggest that games have the potential
for training systems thinking competencies—understanding the entities and relationships
between entities in a system, as well as the behavior of that system as a whole. Like much
research on games for learning, however, these studies have not identified specific mechanisms,
mediators, or moderators of this learning process; instead, they atheoretically measured learning
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outcomes (see Bryant & Fondren, 2009). Although the preceding studies suggest that learning
systems thinking from playing games can happen, without investigating mechanisms or theories
related to this learning, it is not possible to understand either how this learning happens or how it
can be facilitated.
Some of the most systematic, but nevertheless indirect, evidence for the process and
antecedents of developing mental models that are analogously related to a system comes from a
program of research on a relatively simple system: the number line (e.g., Ramani & Siegler,
2008). The number line is a linear, ordinal system of integers. This research program has
experimentally investigated the antecedents of preschoolers’ and kindergarteners’ understanding
of the number line from playing an analog game: the physical structure of the game and the
actions learners performed during gameplay. Mental model development was inferred from
students’ improvement—or lack thereof—in terms of several basic numeracy skills related to
linear, ordinal representations of integers. In particular, they measured magnitude comparison
and number line estimation. Magnitude comparison is the ability to identify which of two
integers is larger. Number line estimation is the spatial accuracy of placing an integer on a blank
number line. In terms of the game’s physical structure, only the linear version—as opposed to a
circular version—of a numeric analog game led to preschoolers’ improvements in the
aforementioned numeracy skills (Siegler & Ramani, 2009). These findings suggest that mental
models based on a linear numeric game were structured in a linear fashion (Siegler & Ramani,
2009). In other words, the structures of learners’ mental models were analogous to the physical
structure of the game. Similarly, the gameplay activity of counting each space on the game board
led to kindergartners’ improvements in the same numeracy skills by reinforcing the ordinal
relationship between the numbers, whereas other kinds of counting did not (Laski & Siegler,

17
2014). These findings suggest that the specific actions performed during gameplay can influence
mental model development. Although these findings relate to how a relatively simple analog
game can be used to develop relatively simple mental models, they nonetheless reaffirm the
theoretical suggestions elaborated above that both material objects and player actions during
gameplay are key to the understanding of games and gameplay.
Potential of Analog Games for Systems-Thinking Instruction
Little research has addressed the potential for analog games as instructional tools. The
experimental research on numeracy learning from numeric analog games reviewed above (e.g.,
Laski & Siegler, 2014; Siegler & Ramani, 2009) is one notable exception. Additionally,
correlational surveys have found that playing analog games outside of school is positively
associated with better magnitude comparison and number line estimation among preschoolers
(Ramani & Siegler, 2008). A small number of other studies have found positive results when
using analog games as instructional tools. For example, a commercial off-the-shelf analog game,
Pandemic (Leacock, 2007), has been found to improve computational thinking among
undergraduate students (Berland & Lee, 2011). Computational thinking is the ability to think
about, understand, implement, and create a series of rules, which in the computational literature
are known as algorithms (Berland, 2011). Because algorithms are series of rules that relate
chains of entities to each other, computational thinking can be thought of as a kind of systems
thinking. In Dominion, for example, one such algorithm might be: 1) Draw five cards from your
deck. 2) If you are unable to draw five cards from your deck, draw as many as possible. 3) If you
were not able to draw five cards, shuffle your discard pile to form a new deck. 4) If you were
initially unable to draw five cards, draw cards from your new deck so that you have drawn a total
of five. This series of four rules, or algorithm, describes the cleanup phase of Dominion, and is a
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simple example of the kind of algorithm with which computational literacy is concerned. In a
very different context, an analog card game improved fourth graders’ in-class and standardized
test scores on fractions more than regular in-class math work (Jiménez et al., 2014; Jiménez,
Arena, & Acholonu, 2011). An analog game about the spread of polio increased children’s and
adults’ interest in global public health (Okitika et al., 2015). Finally, even just using analog game
components in a learning context improved students’ enjoyment of the activity (Lieberoth,
2015). Taken together, these findings suggest that analog games can be effective instructional
tools for teaching systems thinking.
Analog games have two characteristics that may make them particularly effective for
training systems thinking. First, analog games centrally involve material objects. Second, analog
games make players responsible for manually executing rules. Before addressing the role of
materiality and player responsibility for rules, analog games and communication are elaborated
upon.
Characterizing analog games. Analog games involve, at a minimum, both material and
conceptual elements. Their material elements include boards, cards, pawns, tiles, tokens, dice,
etc. Conceptual elements of analog games include the rules, which are descriptions—usually
written—of the meaning of the material components insofar as they relate to achieving the
game’s various outcomes. Rules also delimit what are possible and not possible actions to take
within each analog game. An extensive list of analog games can be found at BoardGameGeek
(“BoardGameGeek,” n.d.). An increasingly popular genre of analog game, Eurogames (Woods,
2012; see “Seven years of plenty,” 2016), are played with material components that may or may
not include a board, have relatively simple rules that in combination lead to many different
circumstances throughout a game, tend to have low elements of luck and high amounts of
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decision-making, and are typified by mechanics for indirect conflict—like auctions, selecting
limited actions, placing tiles, and competing over limited resources. The most well-known
Eurogame is Catan (Teuber, 1995; see “The Settlers of Catan®,” 2015), a game of building
towns and roads on a fertile island. In Catan, players accumulate five different types of resources
to build towns, cities, and roads. Although players compete over the limited spaces on the board,
this competition is indirect. Furthermore, by combining simple rules for building, resource
gathering, and trading, Catan allows for many possible circumstances to arise during gameplay.
Although there is some luck involved, strategic decision-making has more influence over the
outcome. Dominion, which has already been described above, is also a Eurogame. Its rules for
playing and buying cards are very simple, but by combining different cards with different
abilities, there are many possibilities for gameplay. Furthermore, although there are limited ways
of directly harming other players’ positions, the majority of conflict in Dominion is through the
indirect competition for limited stockpiles of cards. Additionally, while there is luck involved in
shuffling decks of cards, making strategic decisions to mitigate this randomness is central to
successful gameplay. Other kinds of analog games are more likely to have more complicated
rules, higher degrees of chance, and more direct conflict. Depending on the specific
characteristics of a given game, mental models of the game system will vary. Mental models of
games without any randomness, for example, will be unlikely to include stochastic relationships
between perceived entities in the game system.
Analog games as communication. Communication is integral to the experience and
process of playing analog games. Because they are played face-to-face (Nicholson & Begy,
2014), analog games are a significant pretext for social interpersonal communication (Woods,
2012), relationship formation and maintenance, and small-group communication (Duncan &
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Berland, 2012). Moreover, communication is central to the gameplay process itself. Not only are
rules learned through collaborative communication (Duncan & Berland, 2012), but they are
negotiated, debated, and enforced via communication (Xu, Barba, Radu, Gandy, & MacIntyre,
2011). Without temporarily halting gameplay to resolve rules disputes, the entire play situation
would disintegrate (Juul, 2011). From yet another perspective, the material game artifact can be
thought of as a communication channel (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). In this view, a player’s
actions during gameplay encode meaning that the other players decode. For example, acquiring a
certain type of card in Dominion may indicate a particular strategy to other players. Acquiring an
attack card might suggest an aggressive strategy, and a player may decide to acquire a defense
card in response. Unlike many other communication contexts, in the case of analog games, the
sender may want to obscure the meaning behind their actions for strategic reasons, by
introducing noise to inhibit other players from decoding that meaning. While acquiring an attack
card, for example, a player may attempt to disguise their true intent—i.e., to attack the other
players—by saying, “I’m only getting this card for its other ability, don’t worry.” In other words,
players may be motivated to increase the uncertainty of their communication partners (cf. Afifi
& Weiner, 2004). While player motivations to increase uncertainty may seem to conflict with
effective instruction, in which clarity is key for learning (Civikly, 1992), these circumstances
may provide a unique situation for learners to practice and improve uncertainty reduction
strategies (see Berger, 1997).
Materiality and action. Analog games’ material components are prominent features of
these games and their gameplay. Engaging with a game’s material elements during gameplay
may uniquely facilitate players’ identification of entities and their relationships in the game
system, thereby facilitating mental model development. These material objects could include
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cards, dice, tokens, or figurines. During gameplay, players manually manipulate these material
objects as they perform actions. For example, players might draw and play cards for abilities,
place and move figurines, roll dice to determine outcomes, and collect or spend tokens
representing resources. In analog games, these material components represent entities within the
game whose behavior and relationships are at least in part described by the game’s rules. Thus,
physically manipulating these material-conceptual objects during gameplay should reinforce the
relationships between entities in the analog game system.
In tabletop miniature battle games, for example, handfuls of dice are used to resolve the
outcomes of players’ decisions. Carter, Harrop, and Gibbs (2014) identified three ways in which
the dice in these games represented relationships between entities in the game system. Because
one die was rolled per unit in an action, the number of dice was directly proportional to the
potential consequences of each given action. In addition to the weight and feel of these dice in
players’ hands, the sound of physical dice colliding with each other and the table reinforced this
analogous relationship. Furthermore, players tended to roll their dice between the groups of
miniatures involved in the action, thus reinforcing the relationship between those two particular
groups by representing it spatially. Horn et al. (2012) capitalized on the representational
affordances of analog games’ materiality by preceding a digital agent-based simulation with a
similar analog game in which students manually controlled the individual agents. This analog
game heightened students’ ability to understand the relationships between agents and the
processes underlying the dynamic behavior in the digital simulation. Furthermore, in a
comparison of digital and analog versions of the same game, players preferred material to digital
components for certain kinds of in-game actions (Ip & Cooperstock, 2011). Specifically, whereas
they preferred to use digital components for automated game set-up, they preferred to use

22
material components for negotiation and trading (Ip & Cooperstock, 2011). This finding suggests
that something about material as opposed to digital objects facilitated negotiation and trading
actions during gameplay. Finally, attaching conceptual meaning to an analog game’s material
objects by defining them through rules may facilitate players’ attention to and recollection of
those concepts. In an experiment in which adults were tasked with arranging either digital
squares or material blocks that were associated with news story summaries, participants who
arranged material blocks recalled significantly more of the news stories (Patten & Ishii, 2000). In
this experiment, conceptual information (news stories) was associated with either digital or
physical objects. The finding that material objects improved recall of conceptual information
suggests that material objects in analog games may facilitate developing a mental model of the
game system by facilitating recall of conceptual information. Taken together, these studies
suggest that manually manipulating material objects during gameplay may contribute to players’
understandings of the relationships between entities in a system. Nevertheless, the role of
materiality in the process of mental model development has yet to be specifically investigated.
Chores and responsibility. In addition to their materiality, analog games require players
to manually enact all changes to a game. Without software to automatically resolve the results of
player input, in analog games players need to manually roll dice, shuffle and draw cards, move
pieces, and do all the other “chores” and “articulation work” that accompany the physical
medium (Leino, 2012a; Mosca, 2011; Nicholson & Begy, 2014; Rogerson, Gibbs, & Smith,
2015; Xu et al., 2011). In Dominion, for example, when an individual plays a card that allows
them to draw another card and buy another card, they must do two things. First, they must
manually draw another card into their hand. Second, they must track the information that they
will be able to buy another card when the time comes. This example points up three aspects of
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performing manual chores in analog games that is expected to facilitate the development of
mental models of the game system. First, there are no hidden entities in the system of an analog
game—whereas digital games may obscure and hide entities within software to which players do
not have access. This accessibility of entities should facilitate their identification for inclusion in
mental models. Second, every time an individual performs an action during gameplay, they
actively perform the relationships between the entities involved in that action. Continuing the
above example, playing a card that allows one to draw another one involves performing the
relationships between playing that card and drawing a card, i.e., manually drawing another card.
This performance should facilitate identification of relationships between entities for inclusion in
mental models. Third, chores in analog games require players to cognitively attend to entities and
relationships. In order to correctly play a game as described by its rules, players have to
continually monitor the game to ensure that all rules have been appropriately applied at the
appropriate time. This cognitive attention should further facilitate players’ identification of both
entities and relationships between entities for inclusion in mental models of the game system.
The Complexity of Game-Derived Mental Models
This study investigates the first steps of the mental model learning process developed
above—the initial development of mental models of a complex system. Specifically, it
investigates mental models of an analog game system. Given the scattered and scant state of
research on learning systems thinking from playing games, this study explores the entities (detail
complexity) and relationships (dynamic complexity) individuals include in externalizations of
their mental models, guided by these research questions:
RQ1

What entities do individuals include in their mental models of analog game
systems?
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RQ2

What are the interrelationships between the entities in individuals’ mental models
of analog game systems?
Method

To address these research questions regarding the complexity of individuals’ mental
models of analog game systems, data was collected in two stages from an online questionnaire
and an in-person session aimed, respectively, at a) evaluating participant characteristics to
construct study session groups and b) conducting gameplay sessions and documenting
participants’ game-derived mental models.
Participants and Recruitment
College students age 18 and over were recruited from a large, Eastern university in the
United States, and local community members age 18 and over were recruited from the area
surrounding this university. College students were an ideal population for this study because not
only are they actively engaged in learning complex material that could be understood in terms of
systems, but they are also preparing to enter the workforce—a complex system in and of itself.
As such, they represented a target audience for game-based learning. Because different
disciplines attract students with different thinking styles (Kolb, 2014) that may influence how
they mentally model systems, college student participants were recruited from general education
classes, which are taken by a wide variety of academic majors, through announcements both inclass and through online class portals (see Appendix A for this announcement). Local
community member participants were recruited through local neighborhood social media groups.
Participants were told that they would play a board game and that the study was about how they
thought about board games. No incentive for participation was offered.
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Participants completed an initial online survey (see Appendix B for the complete survey)
in which they indicated their availability for the in-person session in two-hour weekend time
slots. During recruitment, sign-ups were checked multiple times daily and participants were
scheduled manually in groups of three to four, at which point they were sent an email with
logistical information and a reminder of the purpose of the study. Sessions of three to four
participants were decided upon because three to four is in the center of the range of ideal sizes
for collaborative small-group learning, which is thought to be between two and six individuals
(A. L. Brown & Campione, 1996; Heller & Hollabaugh, 1992; Johnson, Johnson, Holubee, &
Roy, 1984). In larger groups, however, individuals’ clarification questions are more likely to be
ignored (Webb, 1989) and they are more likely to experience hostility than those in groups of
two or four (Eastin, 2007). Participants who indicated that they had experience playing
Dominion were grouped together whenever possible, although during study sessions all
participants except one indicated that they had never before played or heard of the game. This
prevented situations in which expert players could teach the novice players how to play, which
may have influenced the mental models of the novice players. Whenever possible, groups were
gender balanced with two men and two women to minimize differences in gender dynamics
between groups. Three days before their scheduled session, participants were emailed to remind
them of the study and the time they agreed to.
Sampling was performed until saturation (Bowen, 2008b), which is the point at which no
new information is being captured during data collection, leading to diminishing returns for
collecting novel data (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). To identify the saturation point, entity
description data was open coded as it was collected, constantly comparing the new to the old
(Glaser, 1965). Because of the likelihood that participants would identify a small number of

26
additional, idiosyncratic entities (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004), saturation was defined as the point at
which no more than one new entity had been identified in the most recent three participants.
Saturation was reached at N = 30.
Design, Procedure, and Data Collection
Pre-session survey. Participants signed up via the online survey (see Appendix B for the
complete survey) for an in-person study session at the lab, and were instructed to arrive on time
to their scheduled start time. The stimulus game—Dominion, described in detail below—was
fully set up and covered before participants arrived for each in-person study session.
Study introduction. Upon arriving at the lab, participants were thanked for their
participation and consented individually (see the consent form in Appendix C) to minimize any
group pressure to do so. They were reminded that the study involved playing a game and then
doing a writing and drawing activity related to their thoughts about the game. After verbally
reviewing the key points of informed consent and the nature of the study and asking if they have
any questions, they were informed that they may leave without any penalty or effect. All
participants signed the informed consent form after reviewing it.
After consent, participants were seated at a table with Dominion, with the game obscured
by a sheet of posterboard. Dominion was not shown to participants until a) all participants had
arrived or b) if participants were late, 10 minutes since the scheduled starting time had elapsed,
to ensure that they did not begin to form pre-conceptions about the game before the study began.
As participants were seated, they were not given instructions for how to interact with each other,
such as making introductions or remaining silent before the study begins, so as to maintain as
natural as possible a group dynamic between players.
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Gameplay session. Two to four participants participated in each session. Before
participants arrived, Dominion had been setup to standardize the layout of gameplay materials
and to minimize the duration of the study session. All materials remained covered until the
session began. Players also received standardized playmats (see Appendix D) on which to place
their game materials, again to standardize the play situation across sessions. These playmats
were also intended to reduce the number of things participants need to track (i.e., what card types
were called and where they should be placed) while learning the game, thereby reducing
extraneous cognitive load (Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998) associated with learning the
mechanics of the game so that they could focus instead on learning the dynamics of the game
system. Standardizing the layout of the materials also minimized variability in terms of how the
physical layout of the game might have influenced participants’ mental models of the game
system. Additionally, each participant was presented with an identical simplified rulebook
(removing extraneous content provided by the game’s publishers, e.g., examples, derivative
scenarios) while still conforming to the standard set of rules. This fidelity of session rules to
published game rules had one exception: players were told that the winner was the player with
the most points after 10 rounds instead of the usual ending and win conditions. This round limit
standardized the amount of exposure that participants had to the game, thus contributing to the
comparability of their mental models by limiting variation in the progression of games across
sessions. Additionally, the round limit restricted the amount that players were able to learn by
observing other players (Wegner, 1987), which was desirable because the other players in each
group represented uncontrollable variation that may have influenced participants’ individual
mental models.
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When all participants had arrived, the game was uncovered and participants were asked
to learn and play it from the short rulebook and the text on the cards (see Appendix E for the full
study protocol and script). Not providing verbal instructions mitigated any potential for
participants to rely on the researcher as an expert in the game. After playing the game for 10
rounds, participants were separated and given written instructions to follow for the cognitive
mapping exercise described below. Once participants completed their cognitive maps,
participants were dismissed. The in-person sessions lasted about 90 minutes each.
Cognitive mapping task. After playing for 10 rounds, participants individually followed
written instructions for a cognitive mapping exercise designed to externalize their mental models
of the game they had just played (adapted from Brandstädter, Harms, & Großschedl, 2012).
Because mental models are cognitive representations, they are not directly accessible, and some
procedure for externalizing them was necessary (Gray, Zanre, & Gray, 2014). All potential
procedures to externalize mental models are necessarily incomplete and subject to potential
demand effects (Doyle, Radzicki, & Trees, 2008). Nevertheless, this cognitive mapping
procedure was designed with three main considerations in mind. First, to capture the entities that
participants found most subjectively salient, and not potential entities that the researcher
suspected were important, prompts (see Appendix E) were created to be as non-leading as
possible. Second, to reduce cognitive demand during recall (Grenier & Dudzinska-Przesmitzki,
2015; Kearney & Kaplan, 1997; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004), this procedure was divided into
multiple, discrete steps. Third, following the conception of mental models developed in the
preceding literature review as a cognitive representation of interrelated entities, this cognitive
mapping procedure was designed to diagrammatically elicit the entities and their
interrelationships that participants perceived in Dominion’s game system. Following Gray et al.
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(2014), this process is called “cognitive mapping” to distinguish externalized representations of
mental models from cognitive mental models proper. The products of cognitive mapping are
called simply “cognitive maps.” This procedure (see Appendix E for the full procedure), first
asked participants to generate a list of things they thought were important to their play of the
game before asking them to identify how they were related with arrows and descriptions of those
relationships. See Figure 5 for an example cognitive map.

Figure 5. An example cognitive map transcribed by the researcher.
Immediately after the conclusion of the game, the researcher asked participants to move
into different corners of the room that were arranged with tables and chairs. Separating
participants from each other minimized their influence on each other’s performance in the
cognitive mapping task, and separation from the game materials ensured that mental models
were elicited from memory (Doyle et al., 2008). They were given a medium-point marker, a
stack of small sticky notes, and a written prompt that guided them through the first step of
cognitive mapping, as described below. Prompts were provided in written format to allow
participants to proceed through each task at their own pace. The second step in cognitive
mapping involved arranging these sticky notes on a large piece of blank paper and drawing
arrows between them, as well as labeling these arrows. So as not to restrict the number of entities
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in participants’ cognitive maps, small sticky notes and large pieces of paper were used. To try to
elicit discrete entity descriptions by preventing participants from writing too small on each sticky
note, medium-point markers were used.
The first step in this cognitive mapping exercise asked participants to identify the
elements of the game that they found salient and to write them on sticky notes, which would be
used for subsequent steps in the process: “We are interested in how you think about the game
you just played and what you think is important. When you think about the game you just
played, what are the things that come to your mind? Reflect on this question for a moment, and
then write each thing on a separate sticky note and set them aside. Write as many as you’d like.
Just make sure to note the things that you thought were important while you were playing. Go at
your own pace. It’s okay to make any changes you want as you go along. Wave to the researcher
when you feel satisfied with what you have written.” As mentioned, this and all other prompts
were designed to be as open-ended and non-leading as possible, so as not to influence the type of
entities participants described.
Further steps in the procedure asked participants to arrange and diagram these sticky
notes to identify relationships between them. After participants completed the first prompt, they
were given the second prompt and a large blank piece of paper, and their pad of blank sticky
notes was replaced with another pad of slightly differently-colored sticky notes to allow the
researcher to identify any entity descriptions added during the second part of cognitive mapping.
Their medium-point markers were also replaced by pencils and erasers to allow them to revise
their arrows as they rearranged sticky notes on their large piece of paper. The second prompt was
divided into several pages as a flipbook, because it involved several steps (see Appendix E).
Participants were asked to arrange their sticky notes on the large, blank piece of paper before
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asking them to indicate relationships between them with arrows. They were then asked to
describe each relationship, and finally asked to circle the most important part of their diagram.
These prompts were designed to be as open-ended as possible, and participants were encouraged
to revise as they saw fit.
Study session completion. After participants completed their cognitive maps, they were
brought back to the gameplay table to inspect their decks at the end of the game so they could
count their victory cards to see who won. As defined above, games include variable outcomes
(Juul, 2011), so it was necessary to provide this closure for participants. Afterward, they were
thanked for their participation, asked if they have any questions or concerns, and then dismissed.
Data preparation. After participants left the session, participants’ cognitive maps were
photographed to preserve them for analysis. See Appendix F for participants’ anonymized
cognitive maps. A notecard of the study session date and time and the participant’s identification
number was included in the photograph for record-keeping. Photographs of participants’
cognitive maps were transcribed and converted to spreadsheet format for analysis. Both the
content of individual sticky notes, as well as participants’ descriptions of the arrows between
sticky notes, were transcribed verbatim, including misspellings, capitalization, and punctuation.
At the conclusion of data collection, participants’ email addresses were expunged from all data
systems, including Qualtrics and email clients, in order to preserve participant confidentiality. In
total, 30 participants wrote a total of 227 sticky notes (M = 7.69, SD = 3.16, range = 3 – 19) and
drew a total of 207 arrows (M = 6.90, SD = 3.78, range = 2 – 15) between them. After
transcribing each day’s cognitive maps, entity descriptions were compared for saturation.
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Measures
Because this study was primarily exploring the qualitative data collected via cognitive
mapping, few measures were collected in the initial online questionnaire. Measures were
collected to group participants for in-person study sessions. Gender was used to attempt to
gender-balance every study session, while experience with the game used as stimulus material
was collected to group experienced participants together.
Demographics. Five open-ended items prompted participants for brief responses about
their demographic characteristics: age, gender, ethnicity, major, and year in college.
Analog gaming experience. Subjective expertness with various analog games was selfreported with 10 10-point semantic differential items (0 = Never played to 10 = Expert). The 10
most popular analog games, operationalized as the 10 games that have received the most ratings
on BoardGameGeek (“BoardGameGeek,” n.d.), were used. This list will include Dominion. For
each game, they were prompted to indicate their level of experience. Only responses to the item
for Dominion was used to identify novice and experienced Dominion players for study session
grouping. The other games were included only to prevent participants from identifying the game
of interest.
Stimulus Materials
Participants played the popular analog game Dominion (Vaccarino, 2008; see Figure 6) in
which players compete to acquire the most victory points. This game, and its introductory set of
cards specifically, was selected for this study because it contains the five kinds of complex
relationships described in the preceding literature review: indirect relationships, nonlinear
relationships, stochastic relationships, delayed relationships, and feedback loops. See Challenges
to Systems Thinking: System Complexity, pp. 3 – 9, for a description of these relationships in
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Dominion. Furthermore, it was selected for its balance of a relatively simple rule set and
relatively complex gameplay—a combination that would likely be appropriate in instructional
settings. Furthermore, it won the prestigious Spiel des Jahres (Game of the Year) award in 2009
(“Spiel des Jahres: Dominion,” 2015), which specifically targets games that are thought to have
broad appeal to a general audience beyond hardcore hobbyist analog gamers. Moreover, it is both
highly rated and has received many ratings on BoardGameGeek (“BoardGameGeek,” n.d.),
suggesting that people with varied gaming preferences find it enjoyable. As such, Dominion
should be an engaging game for a wider variety of participants and is a good exemplar of
contemporary analog games. In Dominion, players play figuratively as feudal lords expanding
their domains. It is a deckbuilding game, which is a kind of analog game in which players start
with their own small deck of cards and add to it throughout the game, developing more effective
combinations of cards in their personal decks. Each turn, players in order a) play at least one
action card that provides a variety special ability, b) spend treasure cards to buy new cards, c)
discard all their played and unplayed cards that turn, and then d) draw a new hand of five cards
for the next turn. As needed, players shuffle their played and discarded cards to form a new deck
from which to draw.
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Figure 6. Layout of Dominion during study sessions.
Dominion had additional advantages for the stimulus in this study. Its popularity suggests
that it has features that were likely to engage participants throughout the play session. It also has
a relatively short playing time, between 30 and 90 minutes for a full game for new players,
which allowed participants to experience more turns of the game, i.e., to have more experience
with the system in a shorter amount of time. Part of Dominion’s popularity is that it is relatively
easy to learn. It was selected for its learnability, as it was important that participants were able to
teach themselves how to play, since this learning process is the beginning of mentally modeling a
game system. Moreover, Dominion’s recommended number of players is between two and four,
which as described above is, as detailed below, solidly within the ideal range of group sizes for
collaborative learning, an activity that is central to playing a game unfamiliar to the individuals
in a group. This range of group sizes was expected to not only facilitate participants’ learning of
the game, it also allowed data collection sessions to run if one or more of the scheduled
participants failed to attend.
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Data Analysis
Once saturation was reached, more detailed analysis of participants’ cognitive maps
began, which is described in detail for each research question in the next section and summarized
in Table 1. To answer RQ1 about the entities in participants’ mental models of analog game
systems, the categories of entities participants included in their cognitive maps were inductively
discovered with grounded coding. To answer RQ2 about the relationships between entities in
participants’ mental models of analog game systems, the prevalence of different kinds of
relationships between entities was content analyzed.
Table 1
Correspondence of research aims, data, analysis, and outcomes
Research Questions
RQ1 What entities do
individuals include in
their mental models
of analog game
systems?

Data Collected
Descriptions of
entities written on
sticky notes,
converted to
spreadsheet format	
  

Analysis Approach
Grounded coding with
memos: discovering
categories of entities	
  

Analytical Outcome
Catalog and
description of mental
model object
categories of objects in
models

RQ2 What are the
interrelationships
between the entities
in individuals’
mental models of
analog game
systems?

Relationships
drawn between
entities as
directional arrows
plus qualitative
description written
on large piece of
paper, converted to
spreadsheet format	
  

Content analysis: coding
of relationships to
identify prevalence of
types of relationships

Relative prevalence of
different types of
relationships in
participants’ mental
models

RQ1 Analysis: Mental Model Entities
Categories of mental model entities were inductively discovered through grounded theory
coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), recognizing that the researcher was sensitized (Bowen, 2008a)
to the concepts in the preceding literature review. By explicitly recognizing these sensitizing
concepts, the researcher was able to bracket these ideas during inductive analysis (Ahern, 1999).
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Bracketing involved recognizing these sensitizing concepts to enable the researcher to
inductively discover concepts and categories in the data that differed from those to which he had
been sensitized. Because little was previously empirically known about the kinds of entities
individuals include in their mental models of game systems, this inductive approach was
appropriate for generating categories of discrete, identifiable, and small units of data; as such, it
was appropriate for this unit of analysis—the brief descriptions written on small sticky notes in
participants’ cognitive maps.
Using grounded theory coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the data was iteratively open
coded, which involved applying very specific, granular labels to units of data. The data extracts
that were coded were as small as single words or phrases on the sticky notes that participants
wrote and included in their cognitive maps. Because these descriptions were not as discrete as
anticipated, non-exclusive coding, in which each unit can be assigned multiple codes, was used.
In open coding, the researcher labeled entity descriptions and data extracts on a spreadsheet. This
process involved constant comparison (Glaser, 1965), in which each coded unit was compared to
previous units to determine whether they were the same type of thing or different. After open
coding of all units, the codes themselves were compared to each other in reductive coding. This
process identified points of comparison between codes and led to the identification of higherlevel categories or themes in the data. After the first round of reductive coding, each category
was analyzed closely for internal consistency between entity descriptions and codes within the
theme. Next, categories were compared to each other for external differentiation. These
categories were then named and defined. Finally, all data extracts were reviewed once more to
ensure that all applicable categories and codes had been applied to all data extracts. In the final
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round of coding, a conservative approach was taken to potentially ambiguous or vague entity
descriptions, erring in favor of not coding unclear descriptions.
RQ2 Analysis: Mental Model Entity Relationships
Initially, RQ2 had been planned to be addressed with thematic analysis to identify themes
in the kinds of relationships described by participants in their cognitive maps. The collected
relationship description data, however, did not conform to expectations in two ways. First, as
described further in the results, participants did not describe as many of the relationships in their
cognitive maps as had been expected. Because the cognitive mapping prompts asked participants
to describe each relationship, it was expected that nearly all relationships would be described.
Instead, 28.5% (n = 59) of entity relationships were unlabeled. Second, the entity descriptions
that participants did write were not as detailed or as rich as had been anticipated. Because of the
nuance the researcher perceived in the relationships between entity’s in Dominion’s game
system, it was anticipated that participants’ descriptions would also be detailed and nuanced.
Both of these unexpected situations made the data unconducive to thematic analysis.
Given these deviations, it was decided to alter the analysis plan for RQ2 to interpretive
content analysis to reflect the conceptualization of mental model complexity developed above.
Specifically, entity descriptions in participants’ cognitive maps were content analyzed for the
five kinds of complex relationships described in the above literature review: stochastic
relationships, delayed relationships, nonlinear relationships, indirect relationships, and feedback
loops. In fact, this content analysis not only still answered RQ2 by identifying the prevalence of
different types of entity relationships in participants’ cognitive maps, it also more closely
approached the aim of the study by directly addressing complex systems (in comparison to the
original analysis plan).
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Content analysis rules were based on theoretical understandings of these complex
relationships (see Appendix G for the full content analysis codebook). Content analysis began by
identifying every relationship—i.e., every arrow connecting two entities—and coding it for the
type of relationship represented. In particular, relationships were coded for complex relationships
that were defined as involving relationships between only two entities—i.e., delayed, nonlinear,
and stochastic relationships. This coding was non-exclusive—that is, an identified relationship
could be assigned multiple codes—since a given relationship may involve all (or none) of the
kinds of complex relationships analyzed here. All codes were assigned by evaluating three
cognitive map components: the arrow linking two entities, the description corresponding with
that arrow, and (to support inferences made from these data) the linked entity descriptions.
Subsequently, all relationships were coded for complex relationships that involved
relationships among more than two entities—i.e., indirect relationships and feedback loops.
Instead of analyzing discrete individual relationship descriptions, this required analyzing both
text and the cognitive maps that more clearly suggested larger structures. The rules for coding
indirect relationships and feedback loops specified that both a) series of relationship descriptions
had to explicitly, semantically refer to linked entity descriptions, and b) those relationships had
to be in the same direction. In other words, if A influenced B influenced C, both of those
relationships were coded as part of an indirect relationship. If, on the other hand, A influenced B
and C influenced B, neither of those relationships were coded as indirect.
Finally, if a relationship had not been coded as any of the preceding, it was coded as
simple.
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Analytical Lens
In the interpretive approaches employed in the present study, it is important to
acknowledge the researcher’s subjective lens employed as the analytical instrument. Following
post-positivists, I believe ontologically in an actually existing universe independent from
interpreting beings that cannot, however, be directly and fully understood empirically (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2011). I depart from post-positivists epistemologically, however, and see knowledge of
this universe as mediated by semiotic processes of interpretation. As interpreting beings, our
understandings of the world are always influenced by sensory and cognitive organs, culturally
specific categories (Dall & Boas, 1887) and habitual modes of thought (Whorf, 1944), and our
interactional experiences of the world (Biesta, 2010). Each of these influences deserves more
words than are possible here. At a physiological level, our sensory organs can perceive and
distinguish only certain types, ranges, and gradations of physical phenomena. Our cognitions are
limited by our cognitive capacities and structures. Even interoception of internal physiological
and affective states are necessarily limited and shaped by nervous and cognitive systems (Craig,
2003). At another level, perception and cognition are culturally relative. The questions that we
ask about the world, and how we ask them, are tethered to deeply taken-for-granted, culturally
bound categories that vary across sociocultures and times. This cultural relativism makes a
“value-free” social science impossible (Weber, 2011), and is aligned with perspectives that see
knowledge as culturally and contextually situated (Haraway, 1988). Furthermore, our linguistic
and non-linguistic cognitive processes and representations structure what and how we perceive
and conceive of the world (Keller, 2015). Additionally, echoing the insights of pragmatists
(Biesta, 2010), I see knowledge as a consequence of interacting with the world that mutually
alters both myself and the world and kicks off a process of unlimited semiosis (Mladenov, 2001),
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in which interpretations of signs stimulate subsequent processes of interpretation (Bergman &
Paavola, n.d.).
As a consequence, the knowledge I produce as a researcher is a product of my active
engagement with my research object. It is therefore necessarily limited by and situated in my
history, capacities, and perspectives. This perspective makes interpretive qualitative research
relatively unproblematic. All research is an inherently interpretive practice that provisionally
fixes this semiotic chain for future re-interpretation. Different methods produce different
knowledges (Biesta, 2010). I arrive, therefore, at a flexible methodological position like that of
the bricoleur (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Because all knowing is provisional and interpretive, I
am open to using the methodology that seems to best allow me to construct the kind of
knowledge I am seeking. Additionally, the interpretations I represent in my research are shaped
by my cultural and personal history and are an outcome of my interaction with my object of
study. In the present study, results and interpretations thereof should be considered with these
ontological and epistemological grounds in mind.
Results
Of the 30 individuals who participated, 27 were currently enrolled in college, 17
identified as female and 13 as male, 27 identified as white, and the average age was 27 (SD =
12.5, range = 18 – 69). Of those currently enrolled in college, a plurality (n = 11) were
Communication Studies majors. Two participants indicated that they had some experience with
Dominion. Not included in these numbers or the results below were four participants who were
scheduled but did not show up to their study session.
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Entities in Game Mental Models
RQ1 focused on discovering what entities individuals include in their mental models of
analog game systems, toward better understanding how mental model development processes
may facilitate analog game-based learning processes. This research question was addressed with
a grounded thematic analysis of the descriptions of game entities that participants wrote in their
cognitive maps. Participants wrote a total of 227 entity descriptions (M = 7.69, SD = 3.16, range
= 3 – 19) in their cognitive maps. Following the insights of ANT (Latour, 2008) that expanded
the notion of actors to include not only humans, but material objects and conceptual entities,
everything participants wrote on a sticky note in their cognitive maps was treated as an entity
description. This decision was made in order to avoid imposing a priori criteria to these
descriptions when deciding what qualified or did not qualify as an entity. At the conclusion of
data coding, a total of 348 codes had been applied. Five main categories of entities that
participants found salient during gameplay and described in their cognitive maps were
discovered. These five categories were: formal game entities, actions, other players, learning
how to play, and subjective experience.
Formal game entities. Almost all participants (n = 24) described entities that were part
of the formal game—essentially anything contained within the game’s cardboard box or
described by the materials therein. In total, 37.0% (n = 84) of all participants’ entity descriptions
referred to some formal game entity. More specifically, these entities referred to things described
within the rulebook, displayed on game components, imagined during gameplay, or related to the
components used to play the game. These formal game entities fell into three sub-categories: a)
material objects, b) ludic concepts, and c) narrative concepts.
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Material objects. Most participants (n = 16) described material objects as part of their
cognitive maps. In total, 16.3% (n = 37) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to
material objects. They referred specifically to the tangible objects that were part of the game.
Because Dominion is composed solely of cards, these descriptions always referred to “cards,” as
when one participant wrote, “How do you know when to buy the green cards.” In this example,
the participant emphasized the physical quality, “green,” of the card more than its function
within the game, suggesting that they were paying particular attention to the physical, material
characteristics of the cards. More frequently, however, material objects—cards—were mentioned
in combination with other categories described below. For example, one participant wrote “Pile
up copper cards.” In addition to the material “card,” they described an action that emphasized a
material organization of physical objects: “pile up.” Furthermore, they described a specific class
of card, “copper,” which is a ludic concept, as explained below. As other research has suggested,
the movement and manipulation of material objects is the primary way in which individuals
perform actions within analog games (Xu et al., 2011), so it is unsurprising that so many
participants found them salient.
Ludic concepts. Often, participants (n = 23) described ludic concepts. In total, 28.6% (n
= 65) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to ludic concepts. Ludic concepts are related
to the rules of the game. They include game mechanics, rules, and win conditions. This subcategory of formal game entities related to entities’ conceptual role or meaning within the game
rules, and frequently included game-specific terms—e.g., “Victory points” or “rounds”—that
were described in the rulebook or printed on the cards.
Although ludic concepts were often mentioned in tandem with material objects, these two
categories were distinct. Whereas material objects referred to physical things, ludic concepts
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referred to roles, abilities, and game-specific concepts that did not necessarily have a material
form. Although many participants described material “cards” in addition to ludic concepts,
participants also described ludic concepts without reference to material objects. One wrote, for
example: “Obtaining as many victory points as possible.” Here, the ludic concept “victory
points” was described in the absence of any material objects.
Descriptions of ludic concepts often mentioned the class of card (as opposed to cards as
strictly material objects), as when one participant wrote simply, “Victory cards.” Classification
systems are a conceptual understanding of formal game objects. While “cards” referred to a
material object, “Victory” referred to a ludic concept associated with that material object.
Specifically, “Victory” is a part of a conceptual classification system of cards that have particular
meanings, functions, and abilities within the game. In Dominion, Victory cards are worth points
at the end of the game and determine the winner. Another class of cards described were Action
cards, which in Dominion give players unique abilities. Sometimes participants described the
function of Action cards with game-specific terminology, e.g., “Use Action cards that allow +1
Action when I have another action card.” In this example, “+1 Action” was written on the card
itself and described in explicit terms in the rulebook. During gameplay, Action cards with this
specific text gave players the ability to play another Action card. At other times, the function of
action cards were described in more generic terms, e.g., “Use action cards that add coins for
you.” “Coins” have a particular meaning and function in Dominion, in that they allow players to
acquire more cards, and certain Action cards provide additional coins when played.
Ludic concepts also included game-defined goals and strategies for achieving these goals.
As one participant wrote, “My strategy was victory points. Most victory points wins the game.”
Win conditions are an important part of games (Juul, 2011), and in this example, the participant
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essentially reiterated the win condition described in the rulebook: at the end of 10 rounds, the
player with the most victory points wins. Further, this participant’s strategy to win focused on
victory points. The pervasiveness of these goals and other game-specific ludic concepts
described above suggest that participants were concerned with making sense of the game as a
goal-oriented and rule-based activity. As such, these findings support much of the theorizing on
games that has suggested they are, at least in part, defined by rules and goals (Juul, 2011).
Narrative concepts. Participants (n = 4) occasionally described formal game entities that
were narrative concepts—that is, in ways that pointed up the story unfolding in the fictional
world represented by the game through text, image, and action. In total, 2.6% (n = 6) of all
participants’ entity descriptions referred to narrative concepts. Unlike ludic concepts, narrative
concepts are not part of a game’s rules or win conditions. Narrative concepts involved imagining
the meaning of game components, actions, and other players not in terms of rules, but in terms of
the fictional story unfolding through gameplay. One participant wrote that they were engaged in
a “Competition with fellow monarchs” to “Fight for power and money, prevent other players
from surpassing your land size.” The front cover of the rulebook described the theme of the
game as monarchs competing to expand the lands of their domains. This theme was echoed in
the graphics of the cards. By describing the other participants as “monarchs,” this participant
drew on the fictional story of the game. Further, by writing about “land size,” this participant
emphasized this fiction over the related ludic concept of Victory points. The relative infrequency
of narrative concepts is likely a consequence of participants’ focus on material and ludic
concepts as part of their process of learning the game. Learning is discussed in further detail
below.

45
Co-occurrence of formal game entities. Notably, these distinct sub-categories of formal
game entities—material objects, ludic concepts, and narrative concepts—were observed to cooccur within participants’ entity descriptions in many instances. Sub-categories co-occurred
when one entity description was coded as two or more sub-categories. As described above, a
conservative approach was taken toward coding, so the frequencies of co-occurrence are also
conservative. For example, it could be argued that “all the cards seemed important” is a ludic
concept, because “importance” suggests an evaluation of cards in terms of their in-game value.
However, due to the vagueness of the referent of “important,” this entity description was coded
only as a material object for its reference of “cards.” Of 84 total descriptions of formal game
entities, 28.7% (n = 24) included two sub-categories, while none included all three. Cooccurrence primarily occurred between material objects and ludic concepts. In fact, of all entity
descriptions that included a material object (n = 37), 62.2% (n = 23) co-occurred with at least
one ludic concept. Conversely, of all entity descriptions that included a ludic concept (n = 65),
35.4% (n = 23) co-occurred with at least one material object. For example, ludic concepts and
narrative concepts were described together when one participant wrote, “More benefit
continually purchasing land. Maybe not true if more rounds.” “Land” was a narrative concept
because it describes what victory cards and points represented within the fiction of the game both
through the images printed on cards and the text describing the game theme on the cover of the
rulebook, whereas “rounds” were a ludic concept by which players’ actions were meaningfully
subdivided during gameplay. Rounds organized the game into discrete, meaningful chunks of
action that measured the progress of the game and the approach of its conclusion. In this
example, the value (“benefit”) of the narrative concept of land was evaluated in terms of the
ludic concept of rounds. In another example, material “cards” were also described in
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combination with ludic concepts like game-specific abilities: “Getting Action cards with the
‘buy’ feature.” Here, the material card and its ludic classification (“Action”), as well as its
affordance—the chance to buy more cards (“‘buy’ feature”)—were described in combination.
When formal game entity sub-categories co-occurred within entity descriptions, they often cooccurred more closely than the preceding example, as in the frequently mentioned “Victory
cards.” Here, “cards” referred to a material object, while “Victory” referred to a ludic
classification. In this example, this word-by-word co-occurrence suggests that these subcategories, while analytically distinct, were sometimes elided in practice.
Player actions. In addition to formal game entities, most participants (n = 16) described
entities that were player actions. In total, 17.6% (n = 40) of all participants’ entity descriptions
referred to player actions. Player actions are behaviors participants performed during gameplay.
Although actions related to the preceding formal game entities, they were distinct because these
actions described what participants actually did with those formal game entities during
gameplay. Within entity descriptions, player actions co-occurred with all three sub-categories of
formal game entities, and 75% (n = 30) of actions were described with an associated material
object (n = 20), ludic concept (n = 20), or narrative concept (n = 1). This close relationship of
player actions to ludic concepts and material objects supports theorizing on games as
assemblages of interrelated conceptual, material, and human actors that interact in the process of
gameplay (Taylor, 2009). The two most frequently mentioned player actions were acquiring and
using. In Dominion, players acquire cards by taking them from the supply and adding them to
their decks. They use cards by placing them face-up to make use of the various abilities written
on them. Player actions also included discarding and trashing. Players discard cards by removing
them from their hands and placing them in their discard piles. They trash cards by removing
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them from their hand and placing them out of the game. These actions corresponded to the gamedefined activities players performed during their turns. Although these actions were explained in
the rulebook, they were distinct from ludic concepts because they involved a behavior.
Moreover, player actions were described not only in relation to ludic concepts, but in relation to
material objects and narrative concepts as well. For example, participants described acquiring in
terms of ludic-material victory cards (“collect victory cards @ end”), strictly ludic victory points
(“Using the multiple action cards with the "draw" and "buy" feature to buy victory point”), and
strictly narrative land (“More benefit continually purchasing land. Maybe not true if more
rounds”). These examples suggest that action transcended the three sub-categories of formal
game entities.
Several participants (n = 7) described particular sequences of various kinds of actions.
These sequences of actions involved performing actions in a specific order or during a specific
part of the game. One participant, for example, wrote: “Collect cards early then focus on victory
points.” Here, the participant described a sequence of acquire actions: first, acquire cards; next,
acquire victory points. Although the same action was described twice in sequence, the formal
game entity with which it was associated varied. From these short descriptions, it was unclear
whether participants were conceptualizing sequences of actions as systems themselves (see
Latour, 2008 on objects as networks) or combining them as cognitive shortcuts.
Sociality. Many participants (n = 12) described some aspect of sociality in their cognitive
maps. In total, 8.8% (n = 20) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to sociality. This
category included any mention of the other participants in the study. Although the researcher was
sitting next to the participants, no participants mentioned him in any entity descriptions. Some of
these descriptions only very generally referred to other players, as when participants mentioned
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the number of players in the group. In addition to other players generally, sociality included
orientations to other players and surveillance of other players.
Other players. A few participants (n = 3) referred to other players in a general sense. In
total, 2.6% (n = 6) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to other players generally. One,
for example, wrote, “The game is fun and easy to learn. I could see it being a lot more fun with a
large group of people.” This participant compared their actual experience of playing Dominion to
a hypothetical experience of playing the game with a greater number of other players (i.e., “with
a large group of people”). Although relatively uncommon, this general reference to other players
suggested their relevance to understandings of gameplay. The following two sub-categories of
sociality elaborate more specifically on the role of other players in the game.
Orientations to other players. Several participants (n = 6) wrote about either a
competitive or a cooperative orientation toward the other participants. In total, 4.8% (n = 11) of
all participants’ entity descriptions referred to orientations to other players. Orientations toward
other players were either in terms of competition for the rulebook-defined win condition or in
terms of cooperation and helping each other achieve an alternative goal. A competitive
orientation involved attempting to beat other players and achieve the game-specific win state
(i.e., having the most victory points at the end of 10 rounds), as well as competing for game
resources generally. A cooperative orientation, in contrast, involved helping each other. One
participant described a shift from cooperating with each other at the beginning of the game to
competing with each other toward the end: “I think the most important factor was helping each
other learn the game @ first, then creating a strategy that helped build a winning deck.” A
cooperative or competitive orientation toward the game intersected with players’ goals. For
example, one participant preferred cooperation to pursuing other potential goals, such as the
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explicitly described victory condition in the rulebook: “Cooperation / helped each other (more
fun than the object).” Here, a cooperative orientation prevailed over the competitive goals
described in the rulebook. This supersession of cooperation over competition aligns with
previous findings that, over time, a communicative orientation can supplant a competitive
orientation even in explicitly competitive games (W. J. White, 2012).
Surveillance of other players. Besides cooperation and competition, a few participants (n
= 4) described surveillance of other players. In total, 1.8% (n = 4) of all participants’ entity
descriptions referred to surveillance of other players. This surveillance specifically referred to
keeping track of what other players were doing in the game. A few participants wrote that they
thought attending to and remembering other players’ actions was important, as when one wrote:
“Need to keep track of other players actions at all Times.” If playing competitively, tracking
other participants’ actions could inform which cards to acquire and play, and when. The relative
infrequency of this sub-category is likely due to that fact that participants did not have prior
experience with the game, and were focused on their own understanding of how to play the
game, as described in the next category.
Learning processes. Most participants (n = 16) described entities related to learning how
to play the game. In total, 12.8% (n = 29) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to
learning processes. Learning to play the game involved making sense of the ludic concepts,
material objects, and actions described above. Several participants also described interacting and
communicating with other players as part of their learning process. Some participants described
specific learning strategies that they employed during the game, such as referring to the
rulebook. While some participants found the rulebook helpful for their learning, others did not.
Some, for example, found specific parts of the instructions useful: “the sample turns portion of
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the instructions was useful to a beginner.” In particular, this participant found the example of the
first three turns helpful. Other participants, however, wanted additional clarification: “Clarify
instructions in terms of when u can buy pennies.” Other learning strategies, such as asking
questions, centrally involved other players. In fact, collaborative communication was a frequent
learning strategy, exemplified by the following: “It was important to talk to the other players to
make sure we all understood.” Here, “talk[ing] to the other players” served a particular learning
function (i.e., “to make sure we all understood”). Although there was some overlap between
collaborative learning strategies and a cooperative orientation toward other players, some
participants described collaborative learning without a cooperative orientation, while others
described a cooperative orientation without collaborative learning. At times, participants’ focus
on learning how to play subsumed any attempt to pursue other potential goals. One participant,
for example, described focusing on learning before attempting to win the game: “I think the most
important factor was helping each other learn the game @ first, the [sic] creating a strategy that
helped build a winning deck.” This participant thought that a strong group understanding of the
game was an important precondition for approaching it competitively, suggesting that the
distinction between competition and cooperation is not so clear cut. In analog gaming
communities more broadly, players often value social relationships and social interaction more
than in-game victory (Woods, 2012).
Subjective experience. Almost all participants (n = 25) mentioned the final entity
category, subjective experience. In total, 40.1% (n = 91) of all participants’ entity descriptions
referred to subjective experience. Subjective experience related to participants’ overall
experience of playing the game. It reflected participants’ evaluations of and affective reactions to
the game.
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Confusion and uncertainty. Because so many participants (n = 17) included confusion
and uncertainty in their cognitive maps, a sub-category was created for this specific affective
reaction. In total, 18.1% (n = 41) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to confusion and
uncertainty. While several players described being very confused, such as one who simply wrote,
“'CONFUSING!,” others wrote that their confusion was reduced over the course of the game:
“game was confusing at first but became really fun at the end.” While the former participant
seemed to have never satisfactorily resolved his or her confusion, the latter appeared to have
done so. To relieve some of this uncertainty, participants employed the learning strategies
described above. As can be seen from these two examples, these learning strategies were not
always successful. At times, confusion about the game influenced whether players oriented
toward other players cooperatively or competitively, as with the participant who wrote: “Not
really a competition / We didn't understand enough to care about competing.” Here, confusion
led directly to a non-competitive orientation. Again, understanding the game was seen as a
precondition for approaching it competitively, and this understanding was lacking. In addition to
general confusion about playing the game, some participants described uncertainty about more
specific aspects of the game. One participant, for example, wrote: “How do you know when to
buy the green cards.”
Other reactions and evaluations. Besides confusion and uncertainty, almost all
participants (n = 24) included some other reaction to or evaluation of the game in their cognitive
maps. In total, 23.8% (n = 54) of all participants’ entity descriptions referred to some other
reaction to or evaluation of the game. Many participants evaluated whether the game was fun or
not, how easy or difficult it was to play or learn, whether they wanted to play it again, and
whether they thought it seemed like another game they had experience with. One participant, for
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example, negatively evaluated the game’s appearance in contrast to the fun they experienced
while playing: “Game looked cheap at first but was actually really fun to play.” Some
participants described affective states like frustration and stress that were influenced by their
confusion and uncertainty about how to play the game, such as the participant who wrote:
“frustrating not knowing if we were doing it right.” Here, the participant expressed uncertainty
(i.e., “not knowing if we were doing it right”) that led to a different affective reaction:
frustration. This example, and others throughout participants’ cognitive maps, suggest that
understanding the game is necessary to enjoy it. While the game’s challenge prevented some
players from enjoying it, others found this challenge of playing part of the fun. One participant,
for example, wrote that it “Would be really fun with people experienced with the game.” Here, a
participant thought that understanding the game—i.e., experience—would lead to more
enjoyment. The broad range of subjective reactions to the game suggests that there is some
individual-level—or possibly group-level—difference that leads different people to respond to
the same game in quite different ways. Both understanding of the game, as well as motivations
for play, likely influence whether an individual (and a group) will enjoy playing analog games,
and which sorts they will enjoy (see Woods, 2012 for a discussion of analog gameplay
motivations).
Miscellaneous. Some open codes that entity descriptions received were idiosyncratic and
did not meaningfully pattern with other coded entities. These codes and descriptions were
maintained as a separate, miscellaneous category. Some descriptions were too vague to
categorize, such as single words describing broad concepts, like “power” and “control.” These
broad concepts may have been related to ludic concepts like victory points, to competition with
other players, or to managing randomness. Not enough detail was provided, however, to
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discriminate between multiple possible interpretations. A few participants wrote about “strategy”
in a generic sense, but nothing about a specific strategy. Whereas specific strategies were
categorized under ludic concepts, generic “strategy” was left under miscellaneous because it was
too vague to interpret. Additionally, two participants mentioned specific issues that they felt
made them perform poorly in the game, but were not obviously part of their subjective
experience of the game.
RQ1: Detail complexity of game-derived mental models. To answer RQ1, then,
participants included five main categories of entities in their cognitive maps, interpreted here as
externalizations of their mental models of the Dominion gameplay experience. These results are
summarized in Table 2. One such entity category emerged related to formal game entities, with
three sub-categories: material objects, ludic concepts, and narrative concepts. A second category
of entities was the player actions that participants made while playing the game, which employed
the aforementioned material, ludic, and narrative entities. Third, participants described
sociality—not only other players generally, but also how they oriented toward other players
either competitively or cooperatively and surveillance of other players’ actions. The fourth key
category of entity in participants’ cognitive maps was their learning process, which included the
strategies that they used to understand how to play the game. The final category of entity that
participants found salient was their subjective experience of playing the game, including both
feelings of confusion and uncertainty, as well as other reactions to, evaluations of, and
reflections on the gameplay experience.

54
Table 2

Description

Sub-category

Summary of entity description categories

Category

Formal game
entities

Description
Tangible objects that were part of the game

Example (coded words bolded)
How do you know when to
buy the green cards

Getting action cards with the
"draw" feature

16.3% (37)

Entity
Participants descriptions
(N = 30)
(N = 227)
53.3% (16)

28.6% (65)

When do you start using all
17.6% (40) your actions instead of just
buying more of those

Competition with fellow
monarchs
53.3% (16)

2.6% (6)

2.6% (6)

10.0% (3)

4.8% (11)

Concepts that were meaningful to individuals because of their
role within the game, including how they are described in
76.7% (23)
rulebooks, the game-specific abilities that they allow, and the
game-specific goals that they are used to achieve
Concepts that involved imagining the meaning of game
components, actions, and other players in terms of the fictional 13.3% (4)
story unfolding through gameplay

General references to other players

20.0% (6)

–

Other players

Either a competitive or a cooperative orientation toward the
other participants

–

Orientations to
other players

1.8% (4)

80.0% (24)

56.7% (17)

40.0% (12)

Fun game overall. Would
definitely play again. More
23.8% (54)
people would make for a more
interesting game

I think we all might not have
had a full grasp of the rules
18.1% (41)
but it was still an enjoyable
experience

It was important to reference
12.8% (29) the booklet to make sure we
weren't making mistakes

The game is fun and easy to
learn. I could see it being a lot
more fun with a large group
of people.
Cooperation / helped each
other (more fun than the
object)
Need to keep track of other
players actions at all Times
13.3% (4)

The affective and cognitive experience of confusion and
uncertainty about gameplay

–

Observing and tracking behaviors performed by other
participants

Confusion and
uncertainty

–

Surveillance of
other players

Material objects
Referred to things
described within the
rulebook, displayed
Ludic concepts
on game components,
or related to the
components used to
Narrative
play the game
concepts

The process of
making sense of ludic
concepts, material
objects, and actions

Other participants in
the study

Behaviors participants
Player actions performed during
gameplay

Sociality

Learning
processes

Subjective
experience

Participants’ overall
experience of playing
the game

Other reactions Other affective and cognitive reactions, evaluations, and
and evaluations reflections on gameplay
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Entity Relationships in Game Mental Models
RQ2 asked what interrelationships individuals identify among the entities in their
externalized mental models of analog game systems. This research question was addressed with
a content analysis of the relationships between entities that participants drew and described in
their cognitive maps (see RQ2 Analysis: Mental Model Entity Relationships, pp. 37 – 38, for a
description of the analytical process). In participants’ cognitive maps, participants drew arrows
between the entity descriptions described above to represent relationships between them.
Participants were also asked to describe the relationships represented by those arrows. These
relationships were content analyzed by coding for five different types of relationships that are
characteristic of complex systems: stochastic relationships, delayed relationships, nonlinear
relationships, indirect relationships, and feedback loops (see Appendix G for the codebook).
These codes were not exclusive, so relationships could be coded as multiple of these relationship
types. These kinds of relationships are thought to contribute to the “dynamic complexity” of
systems and mental models (Senge, 2006). For simplicity, these five kinds of relationships will
be collectively referred to as “complex relationships” below. If a relationship was labeled and
not coded as one of these five types of complex relationships, it was coded as a simple
relationship.
Participants drew a total of 207 relationships between pairs of entities in their cognitive
maps (M = 6.90, SD = 3.78). Of these relationships, 28.5% (n = 59) were unlabeled and so
represent deviations from the participant instructions to describe relationships, with 60.0% (n =
18) of participants included at least one unlabeled relationship in their cognitive maps. Given
that an arrow drawn between two entity descriptions in a cognitive map is ambiguous, it would
be inappropriate to speculate what these arrows are meant to represent. A simple relationship is
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presented here as an example of the ambiguity of unlabeled arrows (see Figure 7). In this
example, the left-to-right arrow in isolation suggests that the entity description on the left
(confusion) influenced the entity description on the right (unclear instructions). The relationship
description, however, suggests the opposite direction of influence: that unclear instructions led to
confusion. In the absence of such a description, even the direction of the relationship—to say
nothing of the other characteristics of that relationship—cannot be interpreted. As such, these
unlabeled relationships were excluded from the remainder of this content analysis. The high
prevalence of unlabeled relationships may have been due to general confusion about the game
(see the above results for RQ1), confusion about the cognitive mapping instructions, or a lack of
motivation to complete the task. Unlabeled relationships are addressed further in the limitations
section below.

Figure 7. Example simple relationship transcribed by the researcher.
Indirect relationships. Of the complex relationships that were described, the most
common type was indirect. Indirect relationships involve some entity, A, influencing another
entity, C, through a third entity, B. Therefore, the most fundamental indirect relationship
involves three entities and two relationships. Of the participants in this sample, 23.3% (n = 7) of
participants described at least two indirect relationships in their cognitive maps. Of all labeled
relationships, 13.5% (n = 20) were coded as indirect. See Figure 8 for an example indirect
relationship. This example was coded as an indirect relationship because the participant
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explicitly described confusion influencing their thoughts about playing correctly, and explicitly
described these thoughts influencing their stress level. Of the more complex relationships in this
content analysis, indirect relationships were likely the most common because they had the lowest
specificity, requiring only that participants explicitly describe two relationships such that entity
A influenced entity C through entity B. As such, indirect relationships can be composed of
multiple simple relationships, which are addressed below.

Figure 8. Example indirect relationship transcribed by the researcher.
Delayed relationships. In delayed relationships, the influence of one entity on another is
not immediate, but delayed over time. This time lag itself poses a challenge to identifying
delayed relationships, since outcomes are temporally separated from inputs, events, or triggers
(Sweeney & Sterman, 2007). In fact, only 6.7% (n = 2) of participants described delayed
relationships. Of all labeled relationships, 2.0% (n = 3) were coded as delayed. See Figure 9 for
an example delayed relationship. This example was coded as a delayed relationship because the
relationship description in the center of the figure described a future outcome (i.e., “will
provide…”). This delayed relationship was reinforced in the entity description on the left, which
described a future influence (“future success”) of “Action cards.” Furthermore, these Action
cards were explicitly connected to the “victory points” in the entity description on the right
through the relationship description. As such, action cards in the entity description on the left
were the input that led to the delayed output of victory points in the entity description on the
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right. Participants’ inattention to delays in entity relationships were likely a result of common
heuristics that conceptualize delayed influences as immediate (Sweeney & Sterman, 2007).

Figure 9. Example delayed relationship transcribed by the researcher.
Stochastic relationships. Stochastic relationships are non-deterministic, i.e., they are
influenced by randomness. Despite the centrality of randomness in Dominion through shuffling
and drawing cards, merely 3.3% (n = 1) of participants described stochastic relationships. Of all
labeled relationships, 1.4% (n = 2) were coded as stochastic. See Figure 10 for an example
stochastic relationship. This example was coded as a stochastic relationship because randomness
(“luck of the draw”) was described in the description of the relationship between entity
descriptions. Furthermore, randomness was mentioned in the entity description on the right.
These two entity descriptions were connected by the relationship description, which mentioned
drawing cards—a central activity in the “deck-building games” in the entity description on the
left. The “luck of the draw” in the relationship description was the source of the “80%
randomness” in the entity description on the right. Because of common heuristics that see the
world as deterministic (Resnick & Wilensky, 1998), participants likely did not frequently
consider the role of stochasticity.
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Figure 10. Example stochastic relationship transcribed by the researcher.
Nonlinear relationships. In nonlinear relationships, the proportion of the magnitude of
an input to an output—or an event and an outcome—varies depending on the size of the input.
In other words, nonlinear relationships are curvilinear, and include exponential, logarithmic, and
S-curve relationships. Again, these relationships were very rare in this sample: only 3.3% (n = 1)
of participants described nonlinear relationships. Of all labeled relationships, 1.4% (n = 2) were
coded as nonlinear. See Figure 11 for an example nonlinear relationship. This example was
coded as a nonlinear relationship because the relationship description included a curvilinear
relationship between challenge and interest/frustration. They described how a certain amount of
challenge led to interest in the game, but after a certain point, more challenge decreased interest
and led instead to feelings of frustration.

Figure 11. Example nonlinear relationship transcribed by the researcher.
Feedback loops. Feedback loops involve an entity influencing itself, either directly or
indirectly (see Figure 4 in Challenges to Systems Thinking: System Complexity, p. 9). No
participants described any feedback loops, echoing previous findings that individuals typically
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have great difficulty identifying feedback loops in complex systems (Sweeney & Sterman,
2007).
Simple relationships. Overall, participants only very rarely described the above five
types of complex relationships, necessitating coding of the simpler relationships indicated in the
data. Of the 148 relationships with written descriptions, 81.8% (n = 121) were not coded as
representing any of the five types of complex relationships identified above. In other words, they
represented simple relationships. Out of all 30 participants, 86.7% (n = 26) described at least one
simple relationship, and 66.7% (n = 20) of participants exclusively described simple
relationships. See Figure 12 for an example simple relationship. This example was coded as a
simple relationship because although the relationship between copper cards and victory points
was labeled, there was no indication of a stochastic relationship, a delayed relationship, a
nonlinear relationship, an indirect relationship, or a feedback loop. The preponderance of simple
relationships in participants’ cognitive maps suggests that there was some barrier to participants’
identification of more complex relationships. One possible explanation is that participants
heuristically treated more complex relationships among entities as deterministic, immediate,
linear, and direct. Participants may have used these heuristics to minimize their cognitive load
while attempting to focus on learning the rules and mechanics of the game (see Sweller, 1988 on
cognitive load in learning contexts).

Figure 12. Example simple relationship transcribed by the researcher.
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RQ2: Dynamic complexity of game-derived mental models. To answer RQ2, then,
participants primarily included simple relationships in their cognitive maps, interpreted here as
externalized mental models of the Dominion gameplay experience. That is, they largely included
relationships that were not typical of complex systems and did not frequently attend to stochastic
relationships, delayed relationships, nonlinear relationships, indirect relationships, or feedback
loops, as summarized in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of relationship types in participants’ cognitive maps
Code
Participants (N = 30)
Entity relationships (N = 207, labeled n = 148)
Indirect
23.3% (7)
13.5% (20)
Delayed
6.7% (2)
2.0% (3)
Stochastic
3.3% (1)
1.4% (2)
Nonlinear
3.3% (1)
1.4% (2)
Feedback loop
0.0% (0)
0.0% (0)
Simple
86.7% (26)
81.8% (121)
Unlabeled
60.0% (18)
28.5% (59)
Note. Percentages for unlabeled entity relationships were calculated from the total N; percentages
for other relationships were calculated from the n of labeled relationships (148). Values in
parentheses are ns. Totals do not sum to 100% because only Unlabeled and Simple were
exclusive codes.
Discussion
Summarily, RQ1 asked what entities individuals include in their mental models of analog
game systems. Grounded theory coding of cognitive maps produced by participants identified
five main categories of entities. The first of these categories were formal game entities—things
that were either contained within the game’s cardboard box or described therein. Formal game
entities included material objects, ludic concepts, and narrative concepts. Second, participants
described their own actions—behaviors that participants performed during the game such as
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acquiring or using game components. Third, participants described sociality, which included
entities related other players. Specifically, they mentioned other players generally, orientations to
other players that were either competitive or cooperative, and surveillance of other players’
actions. Fourth, participants described learning processes that they employed to understand how
to play the game. The fifth category of entities was subjective experience, including confusion
and uncertainty, as well as other reactions to and evaluations of the game.
RQ2 asked how the entities in individuals’ mental models of analog game systems are
interrelated. Players’ descriptions of entity relationships in their cognitive maps were content
analyzed for five types of relationships that are typical of complex systems: indirect
relationships, delayed relationships, stochastic relationships, nonlinear relationships, and
feedback loops. Other relationships were coded as simple relationships. Nearly all labeled
relationships were simple relationships, with a smaller but substantial number of indirect
relationships. Very few delayed, stochastic, or nonlinear relationships were identified in
participants’ cognitive maps. No feedback loops were identified.
What Games Are Made Of
This study provides empirical support for the subjective importance of elements that have
been suggested in theoretical and critical-cultural work to be important parts of games and
gameplay—in other words, the entities identified in players’ cognitive maps extend what
“counts” as a game and what games can be said to be made of. As elaborated below, the current
findings are argued to suggest that games are not fully formed until actively engaged in play, and
that these gameplay events include the interaction and intertwinement of material and semiotic,
human and non-human elements. In many ways, these empirical, phenomenological findings
align with recent games studies literature, but from a different epistemological and
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methodological perspective. Existing literature argues for definitions and characterizations of
games from a theoretical, textual analysis, and critical analysis perspective. This study, in
contrast, addressed phenomenological understandings of games and gameplay empirically
through players’ self-reported cognitive maps. Nevertheless, this study’s phenomenological
findings echo the importance of objects, players, actions, and interactions. The alignment of this
study’s RQ1 findings with recent games studies literature is summarized in Table 4. Games
scholars have used terms like “mangle” (Steinkuehler, 2006), “assemblage” (Taylor, 2009), and
“collusion” (Giddings, 2009) to describe games—both digital and analog—as interactions
between heterogeneous actors (see Law, 2009). Common among this body of work has been an
emphasis on material objects (Carter et al., 2014; Evans, 2013; Leino, 2012b; Ralph & Monu,
2015; Xu et al., 2011), the agency exerted by these non-human objects on human actors
(Giddings, 2009; Taylor, 2009), and the active interaction of human actors (Evans, 2013;
Giddings, 2007, 2009; Ralph & Monu, 2015; Taylor, 2009) and non-human actors during
gameplay (Giddings, 2009; Ralph & Monu, 2015; Taylor, 2009).
This study’s findings depart from existing literature on the nature of games and gameplay
in a number of crucial ways. First, as discussed below, certain combinations of conceptual and
material objects suggest that these may be more closely connected than previously expected.
Second, players’ goals are not necessarily a direct reflection of the explicit goals defined in
rulebooks. Third, individuals may attend less to the narrative elements of analog games than is
usually assumed. Further, the present study builds on these insights into the phenomenology of
analog gameplay as it may relate to using these games as instructional tools. Specifically, mental
models formed during complex game play suggest their constitutive entities exist in nuanced
webs of relations—“laminated together,” surprisingly social, and privileging function over
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narrative. Taken together, these findings have implications for using games in instructional
contexts generally, and to train systems thinking competencies specifically. These implications
are discussed below in Practical Implications for Game-based Instruction.
Table 4
Summary of recent scholarship on game definitions and entities in relation to this study’s
findings
Category

Formal
game
entities

Player
actions

Sociality

Learning
processes

Subjective
experience

Sub-category

Literature

Material objects

Material objects (Carter et al., 2014; Evans, 2013; Leino, 2012b; Ralph & Monu,
2015; Xu et al., 2011); Material actors and physical interaction during gameplay
(Giddings, 2009; Taylor, 2009)

Ludic concepts

Game as designed rules (Evans, 2013; Giddings, 2009; Steinkuehler, 2006); Nonhuman agents (Giddings, 2007, 2009); Conceptual actors (Taylor, 2009); Rules
and rule-defined outcomes and goals (Evans, 2013; Juul, 2011); Strategies to
achieve goals (Xu et al., 2011); Conceptual understandings of material game
objects (Leino, 2012b)

Narrative
concepts

Conceptual actors (Taylor, 2009); Fiction (Juul, 2011); Conceptual
understandings of material game objects (Leino, 2012b); Narratives (Ralph &
Monu, 2015)

–

Active interaction of human and non-human actors (Giddings, 2009; Ralph &
Monu, 2015; Taylor, 2009); Player effort toward achieving goals (Juul, 2011)

Other players

Human actors (Evans, 2013; Giddings, 2007, 2009; Ralph & Monu, 2015;
Taylor, 2009)

Orientations to
other players

Community norms of play (Steinkuehler, 2006); Negotiable consequences of
gameplay (Juul, 2011)

Surveillance of
other players

Observing other players (Nicholson & Begy, 2014; Xu et al., 2011)

–
Confusion and
uncertainty
Other reactions
and evaluations

Chores and enforcing rules (Juul, 2011; Leino, 2012b; Nicholson & Begy, 2014;
Xu et al., 2011); Collaborative learning (Xu et al., 2011); Rulebooks (Evans,
2013; Xu et al., 2011)

Subjective experience of play (Giddings, 2009; Ralph & Monu, 2015);
Attachment to game outcomes (Juul, 2011)

Lamination of formal game elements. The frequent co-occurrence of material objects
with ludic concepts in participants’ cognitive maps suggests that formal game elements may
exist in an even more intimate interrelationship than addressed in previous literature. While this
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literature has proposed that material objects, rules, and narratives are interrelated (e.g., Juul,
2011; Ralph & Monu, 2015), this study suggests that they are at times inseparable. As such,
these material objects and conceptual entities may more rightly be seen as “laminated.” That is,
participants described game entities as material and ludic—or rarely, ludic and narrative—
simultaneously and inextricably. These material and conceptual layers, though they could be
teased apart analytically, were fused—laminated—in participants’ descriptions of salient game
entities. Characterizing these material-semiotic entities (cf. Haraway, 1991) as laminated echoes
theoretical treatments of games that have highlighted the “ontological hybridity” of game entities
(Leino, 2012b)—that objects in games are inextricably and simultaneously both material and
conceptual. There are two likely sources for this lamination: rules and action.
Rules beyond rulebooks. By defining the role of material objects, such as cards, rules
contribute to the ludic conceptual meaning of material objects in analog games. It has been
common to refer to rules in definitional discussions of games (e.g., Evans, 2013; Giddings, 2009;
Steinkuehler, 2006). Rules define the possibilities and limitations of the material objects in the
game, and this semiotic relationship between concepts and material objects laminates a
conceptual layer onto these material objects. In this study, participants often referred to learning
and understanding rules, and specifically referred to the “rules” or “instructions.” For these
participants, then, the game rules and the text describing these rules were an important part of
gameplay. In analog games specifically, rulebooks are necessary and central to gameplay (Evans,
2013; Xu et al., 2011) because players are required to enforce these rules during gameplay and
maintain the game through “chores” like reshuffling decks of cards (Juul, 2011; Leino, 2012b;
Nicholson & Begy, 2014; Xu et al., 2011). In analog games specifically, the full written rules are
distinct from in-game text. While rulebooks are more detailed, as players come accustomed to
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them, they reference them less and less (Evans, 2013). In-game text, like that written on the cards
in Dominion, serves as rules shorthand for those specific cards. This in-game text, though often
too brief to be completely understood on its own, is fully explained within the rulebook, but
retains its importance throughout gameplay. Every time a player plays a card, its in-game text is
relevant, because it describes the consequences of having played that card. Both in-game text and
rules laminate ludic concepts onto material objects, which is reinforced by the necessity for
analog game players to enforce these rules themselves.
Actions that bind. Second, the action or behavior that players perform during gameplay,
which are permitted and restricted by the game’s rules, laminates ludic concepts onto material
objects. Game scholars have often suggested that games are not complete until played (Giddings,
2009; Ralph & Monu, 2015; Taylor, 2009). That is, games are not fully games in the absence of
someone to play them. The prevalence of player actions in participants’ cognitive maps in the
present study further suggests that action is an important part of the subjective experience of
games. As such, players’ actions are key to phenomenological understandings of what counts as
part of the game proper. Throughout the game, participants performed actions with materialsemiotic objects that had consequences for them and for other players. Although Dominion’s
rules define the possibilities of and restrictions on using cards, these rules do not tell participants
how to play. Nor do these rules suggest good or bad strategies to players. Instead, participants
discovered the value and uses of different cards through the actions they performed with them
and the observed consequences of those actions. In this way, players attached ludic and narrative
meanings to material objects (cards) that were not contained within the rules of the game as
written. That players’ understandings of entities arise in part through the actions they perform
with them is central to the unique potential game-based learning. Otherwise, students could learn
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as much from simply reading a text like a rulebook. Instead, actively engaging with a game’s
objects during gameplay likely enhances learners’ understanding. This link between action and
understanding echoes the insight of situated cognition scholars that knowledge is a product of
action, and therefore cannot be divorced from it (J. S. Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989).
Moreover, the importance of actions in participants’ cognitive maps re-affirms the notion that
games are incomplete in the absence of active play (Bowman & Banks, in press; Giddings, 2009;
Leino, 2012b; Ralph & Monu, 2015; Steinkuehler, 2006) and that empirical study of gameplay—
as opposed to games as texts or artifacts—is crucial to understanding them (Leino, 2012b). As
individuals actively engage with material objects during gameplay, actions and their
consequences contribute to these material objects’ meanings within the context of gameplay. In
other words, action laminates ludic concepts onto material objects. As such, players’ actions—
not only game artifacts and texts—are central to the creation and communication of meaning
during the course of games-based learning.
Alternative goals. This study also departs from typical understandings of games as goaldirected activities, by revealing that their goals often departed from those described in the
game’s rulebook. Game scholars have discussed the importance of rule-defined goals (Evans,
2013; Juul, 2011), an affective attachment to different game outcomes (Juul, 2011), and
strategies used to achieve these outcomes and goals (Xu et al., 2011). In the current study, many
participants did describe game-defined goals related to winning, strategies for achieving them,
and affective reactions to the game. Notably, however, several participants explicitly rejected the
competitive goals written in the rulebook in favor of an alternative: cooperation and helping each
other to learn. Several participants explicitly wrote in their cognitive maps that they were not
attempting to compete, and therefore were not attempting to collect the most victory points in
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order to win. There is precedent for game communities to reject the designers’ intended goals of
the game (e.g., Steinkuehler, 2006). Indeed, among analog gaming communities, more players
enjoy social interaction with other players than competition, leading most players to pursue goals
other than victory in certain conditions (Woods, 2012).
There are a number of possible reasons for participants in this study to have rejected a
competitive orientation toward the game and other players in favor of a cooperative orientation.
Before even entering the study, participants may have already had alternative goals (see Woods,
2012) and non-competitive gameplay motivations (Sherry, Lucas, Greenberg, & Lachlan, 2006;
Yee, 2006) that they enacted during gameplay. Alternatively, participants’ cooperative
orientations may have been a consequence of the primacy of interpersonal and communicative
orientations toward others, even in the context of competitive games (W. J. White, 2012). This
notion of the primacy of the communicative—the idea that interpersonal communication is the
primary goal of communication (Habermas, 1984)—would predict a more prevalent noncompetitive orientation that focused instead on communicating with each other, so the
persistence of a competitive orientation among many players in this study suggests that this
explanation is unlikely. Instead, participants may have taken a cooperative orientation as part of
learning how to play a new, unfamiliar game. Given participants’ unfamiliarity with the game
and with the other participants’ potential skill at that game, participants may have felt uncertainty
about their ability to compete successfully. As such, instead of competing, they may have
approached the game cooperatively to gather information about the game and other players to
reduce their uncertainty about their relative game competence before even attempting to compete
(Berger, 1997). Additionally, when confronted with an unfamiliar and complex task, like an
analog game system, cognitive load involved in merely learning the task is likely to be high
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(Sweller, 1988). As such, participants may not have had the cognitive resources available to
learn how to play Dominion and attempt to compete with the other players. For some
participants, the confusion they experienced when trying to learn this new game may have led
them to adopt goals related to avoiding success, which is one reaction individuals have when
they feel their competence is threatened (Brodish & Devine, 2009). In this study, some
participants may have felt like they were unlikely to win, and therefore tried not to win by
rejecting competition entirely. Regardless of the specific reason that participants took
cooperative orientations toward the game, this study affirms that players’ goals cannot be
inferred from a formal ruleset, but instead need to be discovered empirically. As such, when
studying games, players’ goals cannot be taken for granted.
Function over fantasy. This study further departs from other games scholarship because
of the infrequency of narrative concepts in participants’ cognitive maps. Games scholars have
suggested that fiction (Juul, 2011)—including the fictional representations of material game
objects (Leino, 2012b)—and the narratives that emerge through gameplay (Ralph & Monu,
2015) are theoretically important to games. In contrast, this study’s participants only rarely
described these fictional and narrative concepts. It is possible that most of these individuals were
not motivated by the fantasy of gameplay (Sherry et al., 2006; Yee, 2006). Alternatively,
participants may not have had excess cognitive resources with which to interpret gameplay as
part of a fictional narrative while devoting cognitive resources to learning how to play (Sweller,
1988). Along similar lines, this narrative level of gameplay likely relies on a certain level of
facility with the ludic elements of the game. In other words, before players are able to understand
gameplay narratively, they need to be able to play the game without attending to the game’s rules
and mechanics. This facility with the game’s ludic dimensions should allow players to focus on
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and engage with the narrative unfolding via gameplay. Needing to think about the game’s rules,
or even reference a rulebook, would likely disrupt this narrative engagement (see Busselle &
Bilandzic, 2009). Once players are able to perform game actions without giving much thought to
the game’s rules, they should be able to attend to the gameplay’s narrative instead. Given the
rarity of narrative concepts in participants’ cognitive maps, it remains to be seen whether
narrative concepts are extensively laminated to ludic concepts or material objects. Because it has
been found that narrative engagement can increase knowledge gained from consuming narrative
media (Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patnoe-Woodley, 2011), the influence of narrative and
narrative engagement in analog gameplay on learning outcomes should be explored.
Overall, the results of RQ1 extend theoretical and critical-cultural work on games by
suggesting that similar actors, entities, objects, and concerns are important from the subjective,
phenomenological perspective of game players. These entities include rules, players, and
laminated material-semiotic objects; actions and behaviors through which material, conceptual,
and human actors interact; group norms and orientations toward the game and other players; and
subjective experiences and reactions to gameplay. In particular, the laminated quality of material
objects and ludic concepts supports the uncommon assertion that heterogeneous actors can not
only be interrelated (cf. Latour, 2008) but can also be inextricably intertwined (Leino, 2012b).
This study challenges prevailing notions of games as activities with rule-defined goals, instead
finding that players’ goals may in fact contradict the goals written in a rulebook. Additionally,
this study complicates the position of narrative in gameplay by suggesting that narrative features
of games are not always accessible, salient, or relevant to players. The inclusion and exclusion of
different categories of entities in participants’ cognitive maps have implications for using
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games—and analog games specifically—in instructional contexts, which are developed below in
Practical Implications for Game-Based Instruction, pp. 74–79.
Gameplay as Communicative Action. As discussed above, players’ descriptions of
actions frequently co-occurred with descriptions of formal game entities, material objects and
ludic concepts in particular. This co-occurrence suggests that action plays a role in the creation
of meaning through gameplay by laminating ludic (and possibly narrative) concepts to material
objects during gameplay. Furthermore, the material objects that players manipulate during
gameplay, as well as the particular behaviors that players perform, hold particular meanings to
players. As such, analog gameplay can be thought of as an inherently communicative process in
which meaning is communicated between players through player actions with material objects.
In other words, materially manipulating game objects during gameplay is nonverbal
communication. During gameplay, communication via action can take place simultaneously with
verbal communication (see Xu et al., 2011). Communication during gameplay, then, is
essentially multimodal, combining verbal communication and nonverbal communication through
action.
Mental Model Complexity
The infrequency of indirect, delayed, stochastic, nonlinear, and feedback relationships in
participants’ cognitive maps, as externalizations of their mental models, suggests that their
mental models of Dominion had relatively low dynamic complexity. Not only did participants
overwhelmingly describe simple relationships, they also left a significant number of relationships
unlabeled. The prevalence of unlabeled relationships in participants’ cognitive maps begs an
explanation. One possibility is that participants perceived, but were unable to externalize, certain
relationships between entity descriptions. Therefore, they may have drawn an arrow to connect
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two entity descriptions that they thought were related, but were then incapable of describing that
relationship in the next step of the cognitive mapping exercise. Alternatively, the prevalence of
confusion and uncertainty in participants’ cognitive maps suggests that participants were in fact
confused about the game. As such, they may have foregone describing relationships that they
were confused or uncertain about. This finding suggests that participants struggled to understand
the relationships among entities in Dominion’s game system. As such, in order to most
effectively use games as instructional tools, learners need additional support to understand these
relationships beyond simply playing the game. Otherwise, their understandings and mental
models of the game will be underdeveloped. Specific suggestions for supporting learners’
understanding of game systems are presented below in Practical Implications for Game-Based
Instruction, pp. 74–79. Additional potential methodologically-related reasons for unlabeled
cognitive map relationships are discussed in the limitations.
Overall, the preponderance of simple relationships in participants’ cognitive maps
suggests that their mental models of Dominion—as a complex game system—were relatively
simple. After playing Dominion one time with no additional instruction, participants seemed not
to conceive of the game as a complex system. Two possible explanations for this finding and
their respective implications are presented below. First, mental model complexity may have been
obscured in participants’ cognitive maps because they aggregated multiple entities and complex
relationships into individual entity descriptions. Second, participants may truly have not
perceived these complex relationships, instead applying simple heuristics.
First, participants may have had more complex understandings than were represented by
the relationships they described in their cognitive maps. Participants’ entity descriptions often
included multiple categories of entities. It cannot therefore be ruled out that participants’ mental
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model complexity was expressed within complex entity descriptions and not in the diagrammatic
relationships in their cognitive maps. For example, a number of participants described specific
sequences of actions within individual entity descriptions. These descriptions may have involved
a complex relationship (e.g., delayed or indirect) among included entities if each entity
description had been more granular. Participants may have combined multiple ideas within
individual entity descriptions because they, like most humans, were used to understanding and
representing the world and themselves in terms of narratives—sequences of meaningful,
connected events (Riessman, 2008). From this perspective, aggregate entity descriptions can be
thought of as micro-narratives describing the game. Similarly, lamination of a material object
and a ludic or narrative concept within a single entity description may indicate mental model
complexity. These laminated entities may indicate complexity because players have moved
beyond understanding gameplay as manipulating strictly material objects, strictly ludic concepts,
or strictly narrative concepts. Instead, lamination suggests that players may understand gameplay
at a material, ludic, and narrative level simultaneously. Some have suggested that more complex
mental models should involve more disaggregated cognitive maps (e.g., Groesser &
Schaffernicht, 2012). For example, a single entity description like “The more supply the more
victory” could have been disaggregated into two entity descriptions—“supply” and “victory”—
linked by an arrow from “supply” to “victory.” Nevertheless, the opposite is also possible. More
aggregated entities (i.e., those including a number of interrelated, constitutive objects) may in
fact be indicative of more complex mental models in which a series of relationships have been
collapsed (Schaffernicht & Groesser, 2013). Instead of representing and describing complex
relationships diagrammatically in their cognitive maps, participants may have been collapsing
these complex relationships into aggregated micro-narrative entity descriptions. As such, it is
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unclear whether more or less aggregated entity descriptions in general—and laminated entities or
sequences of events specifically—indicate more or less complex mental models.
Alternatively, simple relationships may have been participants’ prepotent mode of
interpreting or understanding relationships between entities. In other words, instead of
considering more complex relationships, participants may simply be prone to thinking of the
world in terms of simple relationships. This interpretation aligns with research on systems
thinking that has found that across age levels, individuals typically have difficulty identifying
stochastic relationships (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; Resnick & Wilensky, 1998), delayed
relationships (Sweeney & Sterman, 2007), nonlinear relationships (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006;
Penner, 2000), and feedback loops (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; Sweeney & Sterman, 2007) in
systems. The less individuals are accustomed to thinking about a certain kind of relationship, the
more cognitive load these individuals experience when trying to understand them (Sweller et al.,
1998). As such, conceptualizing complex relationships consumes more cognitive resources than
simple relationships, especially for those not trained in thinking about complex systems. Instead,
individuals’ prepotent conceptualizations of relationships may be based on simplifying heuristics
(see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) that minimize cognitive load. From a “cognitive miser”
standpoint, in which individuals tend to conserve cognitive resources whenever possible (Fiske
& Taylor, 2013), most individuals will tend to use simple heuristics instead of complex
relationships to minimize their cognitive load. In learning contexts, therefore, it is necessary for
instructors to facilitate learners’ attention to these complex relationships. Specific suggestions for
doing so are presented below.

75
Practical Implications for Game-based Instruction
The present study’s findings have several implications for analog games’ potentials as
tools for systems-thinking instruction. Although these implications apply specifically to games
that are complex systems and contain complex relationships, they are relevant to game-based
learning more broadly. Building on the above discussion on the phenomenological experience of
gameplay and mental model complexity, practical suggestions for using analog games as
complex-systems-in-miniature in an instructional context—and for system-thinking instruction
specifically—are presented below. These suggestions for instruction are to: a) embed
instructional objectives in games in multiple ways, b) take an active facilitative role in gamebased learning activities, c) supplement other educational activities with game-based instruction,
and d) use games that are as simple as possible for the instructional objective.
Embed instructional objectives. First, to ensure that mental models of the game include
the intended instructional objective, this objective should be embedded in as many categories of
entities as possible, including material objects, ludic concepts, narrative concepts, player actions,
and game goals. Not all participants included all of these categories of entities in their cognitive
maps, suggesting that there was individual variation in which of these categories of entities they
found salient during gameplay. As such, if a learning objective were embedded in only one or
some of these entities, it is possible that players would fail to engage with the learning objective
by attending only to the other kinds of entities. If, on the other hand, all of these entities were
aligned toward the learning objective, mental models that include any of them should be relevant
to learning objectives. This recommendation echoes earlier findings that mental models
developed through gameplay were influenced by both the physical structure of the game and the
activities players performed during gameplay (Laski & Siegler, 2014; Siegler & Ramani, 2009).
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The present findings suggest that not only the game’s physical structure and player actions (see
Laski & Siegler, 2014; Siegler & Ramani, 2009), but also player goals, social interactions, and
gameplay narratives, may influence mental models. Such an approach should engage formative
evaluation during the game development process to ensure that the intended learning audience
incorporates the intended educational objective into their mental models of the game (Sherry,
2013a). Potential pitfalls of this approach include the possibility that the final game would lack
characteristics that would motivate the desired audience to play it (Sherry, 2013b).
Facilitate mental model development. The second recommendation for instructors is to
take an active role in facilitating students’ development of their mental models of the game
system. In this study, participants’ cognitive maps included varied entities, and they did not
include many complex relationships—that is, they featured detail complexity but not dynamic
complexity. This finding suggests that additional instructional support may be needed to teach
systems thinking competencies that are more advanced than merely identifying entities in a
system, such as understanding complex relationships between these entities (see Anderson &
Krathwohl, 2001; Hopper & Stave, 2008). As such, instructors should orient learners toward
systems’ entities and relationships that are important for instructional objectives. By doing so,
learners’ mental models should be more likely to include those instructionally relevant entities
and relationships. Several methods of facilitation have been proposed in the literature. Structural
debriefing, for example, is essentially a guided cognitive mapping task through which learners
identify the relevant entities, describe their relationships and behavior, build a model of the
system, and test the model against their understanding of the system and its behavior (Pavlov,
Saeed, & Robinson, 2015). Through structural debriefing, learners reflect on and modify their
mental model of the game system, which is thought to facilitate learning by making clearer the
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content and structure of the game or simulation itself (Pavlov et al., 2015). In fact, the discipline
of System Dynamics has coalesced around the notion that diagramming complex systems—such
as games—can facilitate understanding them (Lane, 2008). Besides diagramming techniques like
structural debriefing, learners can also be presented with schematic diagrams of the important
entities and relationships in the game system. When this kind of supporting schematic
information is presented to students with a game simultaneously, however, it risks both straining
cognitive capacities (Kester, Lehnen, Van Gerven, & Kirschner, 2006) and diminishing learner
motivation to play by making the game less fun (Charsky & Ressler, 2011). As such, instructormade diagrams of the game system should be presented to learners only after a gameplay
session, not during.
Another way instructors can promote learners’ mental model development is by making
learning how to play the game as easy as possible, specifically by communicating game rules in
multiple modalities. In this study, several participants wrote in their cognitive maps that they
were confused by the written game instructions and that they had trouble learning from it. In the
present study, players’ only instruction was a written rulebook. During study sessions, several
participants attempted to seek verbal instruction or rules clarification from the researcher, which
was denied to ensure all participants learned from the same written rules. In an instructional
setting, however, verbal instruction should supplement written instructions because learning
from written instructions does not suit all learning styles (Kolb, 2014). As such, instructors
should target multiple learning styles while teaching a game by providing learners written
rulebooks, giving a verbal explanation of the game, demonstrating how the game works, and
giving learners risk-free learning rounds before playing the game in full. By facilitating students’
learning of the game in this way, instructors will reduce students’ cognitive load associated with
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learning the game (see Sweller et al., 1998), enabling them to better understand the game and its
connection to class topics.
Connect gameplay to other instruction. As discussed above, few participants in this
study described complex relationships in their cognitive maps, supporting the view that
individuals’ prepotent understandings of relationships between entities in systems tend to rely on
simple heuristics. As such, playing an analog game in and of itself is not enough to develop an
understanding of a complex system. In the absence of further instruction, learners will likely not
identify the complex relationships in a complex system that are necessary for systems thinking.
Instead, additional instruction is necessary. In order to successfully train systems thinking, it is
necessary for instructors to help students connect their understandings of an instructional game
to systems thinking concepts developed in other contexts. In other words, games should be used
to supplement—not supplant—other instructional methods. Furthermore, connections between
game-based learning and other learning contexts should be attended to directly, so as to promote
learning transfer between them. This suggestion is bolstered by findings that students learn more
when they encounter the same topics across multiple learning activities (Fisch, Lesh, Motoki,
Crespo, & Melfi, 2014), possibly because learners transfer mental models developed in one
learning context to another, providing a foundation for further mental model development (Fisch,
2013). As such, systems-thinking instruction is best delivered through multiple activities and
modalities, including games. Nevertheless, the ideal method of facilitating this sort of cumulative
cross-platform/activity learning transfer is currently unknown.
Make systems thinking games as simple as possible. Fourth, games for learning
broadly—and systems-thinking instruction specifically—should be as simple and focused on as
discrete instructional objectives as possible. This recommendation echoes recent suggestions that
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students may learn more from playing multiple simple business simulations than one large,
complex business simulation (Teach & Murff, 2014). Along these lines, gradually introducing
learners to parts of a system before interacting with the whole system has been found to improve
their ability to identify relationships between the entities in that system (Mulder, Lazonder, &
Jong, 2015). In this study, participants described very few complex relationships in their
cognitive maps. As such, introducing these individuals to a learning game involving all five of
the types of complex relationships studied here may strain cognitive capacities. Instead, learners
may be better served by playing several simpler games that involve only one type of complex
relationship, allowing them to incrementally build their systems thinking capabilities.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with most exploratory, qualitative research, this study’s grounded and content
analyses was subject to the limitations of a small sample size and the interpretive lens of a single
researcher. While this study’s sample size was small, the objectives of the study were not
representative or generalizable findings. Rather, the goal was to identify the breadth of potential
entities individuals might include in their mental models of an analog game. Although data were
collected at the individual level, via cognitive mapping, it was analyzed at the level of individual
entities and relationships in these cognitive maps. Maximal breadth of cognitive map entities was
reached, as demonstrated by satisfying the criteria for saturation (Bowen, 2008b). Additionally,
the subjective influence of the researcher was minimized during grounded coding by following a
process for coding that involved constant checking and re-checking for invalidating data both
within and across categories. Furthermore, the concepts that influenced the researcher’s
perspective were made explicit prior to data collection and analysis, such that they could be set
aside to allow other themes to emerge—a technique known as bracketing (Ahern, 1999). Given
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time constraints associated with completion of this thesis, the researcher’s supervisor
independently reviewed the content analysis for face validity in lieu of conducting coder training
and establishing intercoder reliability. Additional analysis of this data is planned in which formal
content analysis (including reliability evaluations) will be conducted.
Some limitations of this study have been partially addressed above. Some participants
expressed confusion, frustration, stress, and a lack of enjoyment in their cognitive maps. These
negative affective states may have influenced the entities and relationships that they apprehended
during gameplay, as well as those that they included in their cognitive maps. This is a realistic
circumstance for instructors attempting to use games as instructional tools, and recommendations
for facilitating learning have been suggested above. One possible source of participants’
frustration with the game may have been that Dominion is a competitive game, even though
some participants approached it from a cooperative standpoint both in their cognitive maps and
as observed during study sessions. Competitive or cooperative games may function better as
instructional tools for different people in different contexts.
Individual differences and group composition may have influenced study outcomes.
Although this study employed both mixed- and same-sex groups, it had too small a sample size
to identify systematic variation by sex and group composition. Nevertheless, previous research
has found that the performance of men and women on different kinds of tasks, in groups of
different sex mixes, and in competitive or noncompetitive environments is quite varied (Gneezy,
Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Günther, Ekinci, Schwieren, & Strobel, 2010). Furthermore, men
more than women self-report that they enjoy competitive games and are motivated to play
competitive video games (Lucas & Sherry, 2004). Future research should examine a) the effect
of sex-based stereotype threat, competition, and cooperation on learning outcomes from playing
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educational games and b) sex differences in the effect of competitive and cooperative games on
affective dimensions of learning like motivation. Drawing from the above discussion, future
research should also address c) the relative effectiveness of different methods for facilitating
learning transfer between contexts and platforms and d) the optimal ordering of different types of
learning media and activities, which in other contexts has been shown to influence narrative
engagement (Sangalang, Quintero Johnson, & Ciancio, 2013).
As discussed above, participants’ unlabeled relationships in their cognitive maps were not
analyzed. Because of the ambiguity of arrows drawn between entity descriptions, interpreting
these relationships was not possible. Some reasons for the prevalence of unlabeled relationships
in participants’ cognitive maps have been proposed above. Specifically, participants may not
have known how to describe relationships that they perceived, or they may have been confused
about the nature of these relationships. There are potential methodological reasons that
participants may have included so many unlabeled relationships in their cognitive maps: they
may have drawn extra arrows as a demand effect of the cognitive mapping exercise, may have
been tired or unmotivated, or may not have realized that they were supposed to describe every
relationship. Participants may have drawn unlabeled arrows as due to demand effects of the
cognitive mapping exercise. That is, in response to instructions to draw arrows to represent
relationships, they may have felt compelled to draw arrows in the absence of any conception of
such relationships. Additionally, participants were asked to describe these relationships at the
end of the study, at which point they may have been tired or unmotivated to complete the task.
Finally, participants may have included unlabeled relationships in their cognitive maps because
they were confused about the cognitive mapping instructions or about the game itself. It is
possible that participants did not realize they were supposed to write a description for every
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arrow in their cognitive map. Given the preponderance of simple relationships in the rest of
participants’ cognitive maps, it is likely that the majority of unlabeled relationships, had they
been described, would also have been simple relationships. In future studies, attempts should be
made to minimize unlabeled relationships that are caused by research methods by pretesting
cognitive mapping instructions to ensure they are as clear as possible. Future studies should also
seek to understand the causes of unlabeled relationships that are not due to methodology. For
example, game complexity could be manipulated to identify whether greater game complexity
leads to a greater proportion of unlabeled relationships in participants’ cognitive maps.
This study attempted to study mental models of game systems indirectly. Because mental
models are cognitive representations, they are not directly accessible to investigation. As such,
some indirect approach is necessary. In the present study, participants were guided through a
cognitive mapping task designed to externalize their mental models. Operationally, participants
wrote and drew cognitive maps that were diagrams of the entities and relationships between
entities that they perceived in Dominion’s game system. In many ways, this method was
successful. Participants described entities and relationships, as intended. Nevertheless, some of
the cognitive map data was unexpected. Specifically, entity descriptions were richer and more
aggregated than anticipated, while entity relationship descriptions were sparser. Instead of
describing discrete things within their entity descriptions, many participants described
aggregated narratives of what could have been several distinct entities. These narrative entity
descriptions were possibly a product of narrative understandings of the world (Riessman, 2008).
More generally, eliciting responses from study participants through novel kinds of
tasks—such as cognitive mapping—always raises the question of whether differences in data are
due to the variable under study (e.g., systems thinking competency) or participants’ skill at
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performing the elicitation task (e.g., diagramming capability). The cognitive mapping procedure
in this study was designed specifically to address the research questions by a) eliciting entities in
as open-ended a way as possible so as not to lead participants into including or excluding
anything in particular and b) eliciting entity relationships diagrammatically to allow for complex
interrelationships and feedback loops. Other methods of studying mental models are possible.
Some researchers, for example, have attempted to make inferences about mental models based
on participants’ performances in tasks thought to be related to mental models (e.g., Goldstone &
Sakamoto, 2003; Laski & Dulaney, 2015). These inferential methods avoid the difficulties of
elicitation tasks entirely, but do not provide insight into the content or nature of mental models.
An alternative method is to elicit individuals’ understandings of games in the way they are
already prone to present them: narratively (see Riessman, 2008). Several researchers have
elicited narrative descriptions or explanations from gameplayers and then applied formal rules to
tease apart the entities and entity relationships in these narrative descriptions via object-relation
mapping (ORM; Banks, 2014; see also Doyle, Radzicki, & Trees, 1996; Doyle et al., 2008;
Wrightson, 1976). Whereas cognitive mapping involves participants constructing their own
diagrams of a system, in ORM, researchers transform participants’ linear, narrative accounts of a
system into a diagram for analysis. Because ORM involves eliciting narratives from participants,
participants’ relationships between entities are necessarily sequential. As discussed above,
feedback loops—which are not strictly sequential—are crucial features of complex systems. As
such, ORM is not as aligned with the conception of mental models outlined above as cognitive
mapping. Future research should evaluate the validity of these three methods for measuring
mental models—cognitive mapping, ORM, and inferential techniques. Comparing the outputs of
these three mental model measurement methods to other measurements that should be related to
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systems thinking, such as the accuracy of predictions about a system’s behavior, is crucial for
developing a better understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods.
Finally, participants included few complex relationships in their cognitive maps. As such,
few conclusions can be drawn about these kinds of relationships from this study. However, it can
be said that in the absence of any systems-thinking instruction or any instructor assistance,
several participants did identify a small number of indirect, delayed, stochastic, and nonlinear
relationships. With appropriate instruction, learners should be able to understand and identify
more of these relationships. Given how much participants included within their entity
descriptions, future research should investigate if more or less aggregated entity descriptions
indicate more or less mental model complexity. Additionally, future research should identify the
antecedents of entity aggregation. Specific attention should be paid to lamination of entities—
when and why does it happen, and what are the implications of when it does not?
Conclusion
The present study began with the problem of understanding whether and how games
might be able to be used as instructional tools for teaching about systems and systems thinking.
Despite some findings that suggest that games in general—and analog games specifically—may
be effective instructional tools, there were gaps in the literature. Specifically, it was unknown
what elements of games individuals found salient in their phenomenological experience of
gameplay. Furthermore, it was unknown what, if any, kinds of relationships individuals would be
able to identify in a game system without training. Overall, the present study suggests that analog
games may have untapped potential as instructional tools for training systems thinking: even in
the absence of instructor facilitation or systems thinking training, several participants were able
to identify complex relationships in an analog game system. Moreover, the richness of
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participants’ descriptions of system entities suggests that they may have perceived even more
relationships between entities than they diagrammed and described.
Nevertheless, using analog games as instructional tools will not be without its challenges.
Many participants found the analog game used in this study, Dominion, confusing, challenging,
or frustrating. Given these experiences, and given the difficulty of systems thinking generally,
appropriate instructor facilitation is crucial. Furthermore, participants did not attend to the
narrative aspects of this analog game, suggesting the need for additional investigation into the
role of narrative in analog games.
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Appendix A: Recruitment Announcement/Text
Script that was read in classes or posted by instructors to eCampus:

Subject: Play a board game and share your thoughts about it (Research Study)

Body: Dr. Jaime Banks and Mr. Joe Wasserman from the Department of Communication
Studies here at West Virginia University are inviting students to participate in a research study
about how students think about board games—as a member of this class, you are invited to
participate. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to first complete an online survey
about yourself, and then to schedule a time to come into the lab. During this lab session, you’ll
be asked to play a board game with two-to-three other students and then do some writing and
drawing to share how you thought about the game. The survey should take about 15 minutes to
complete, and the lab session should take about 1.5 – 2 hours to complete.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please begin by completing the initial
online survey by visiting this URL: ______________

If you decide to participate in the study, your participation will be completely
confidential—we will not share details of your participation with anyone. WVU IRB approval
for this research study is on file (#TBD). Participation in the study is completely voluntary and
your class and university standing will not be affected in any way if you choose not to
participate.
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Questions about the study can be directed to the researchers, Dr. Jaime Banks and Mr.
Joe Wasserman, at jabanks@mail.wvu.edu or jowasserman@mix.wvu.edu

Thanks so much for your interest in the study, and we look forward to seeing you in the
Lab. =)
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Appendix B: Online Cover Letter and Initial Survey
Greetings!

You are being invited to participate in a confidential study—an online survey and in-lab research
session in Armstrong Hall—conducted by Principal Investigator Dr. Jaime Banks. This research
examines how people think about board games. In order to participate, you must be 18 years of
age or older and currently enrolled at WVU. After participating in both parts of the study, you
will be entered into a drawing for one of three $100 Amazon gift cards.

The study will require just under two hours to complete, in total. This may seem like a long time,
but we think you’ll find it goes quickly since you’re playing a game. This survey is the first part,
and includes questions about yourself and how you play games (10 minutes). The second part is
an in-lab session where you’ll be asked to play a board game with up to three other students and
to write and draw some responses to the game (about 90 minutes). If you decide to participate,
you’ll be asked to indicate your availability for your lab session after you complete this initial
survey. You will then be emailed to confirm your scheduled session.

Your participation in this research is completely confidential, meaning that any of your responses
will not be tied to you individually. Your email address will only be used for scheduling and
distributing gift cards, and will be erased from our files at the conclusion of the study. Your
responses will be used only for the purposes of this study, and will not be shared outside of our
research team (the two individuals listed at the bottom of this document). You may skip any
question(s) that you do not care to answer, or feel comfortable answering. Also, given that some
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of the questions in this survey will require you to type in small amounts of text, we suggest
completing this survey on a laptop or desktop computer with keyboard entry device, rather than a
smartphone or tablet.

Participation in this study is voluntary. Unless otherwise indicated, you may skip certain
questions if you want, and/or you may stop completing the questionnaire at any time without
penalty. Your actual performance in this study or your refusal to participate or withdrawal from
this study will in no way affect your class standing, grades, job status, or status in any activity
associated with the University.

There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. If, however, you feel any
discomfort resulting from your participation, please contact the WVU Carruth Center at (304)
393-4431 for any counseling needs. If you have other concerns about the study itself, you may
contact the WVU Office of Research Integrity and Compliance at
(304) 293-7073.

If you would like more information about this research project, feel free to contact the WVU
Principal Investigator, Dr. Banks, at jabanks@mail.wvu.edu. This study has been acknowledged
by West Virginia University’s Institutional Review Board, and is on file as Protocol #___. You
also encouraged to print a copy of this page for your personal records; you may also request a
copy of this information by contacting Dr. Banks.

Thank you in advance for your time, and for your valuable contribution to our project!
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Sincerely,
Dr. Jaime Banks jabanks@mail.wvu.edu
Joe Wasserman jowasserman@mix.wvu.edu

[

] I acknowledge the information above and willingly agree to participate in this research.
(directs users to the first page of the survey)

[

] I do not wish to participate in this research.
(directs users to a page that instructs them to close the browser window to stop
participating)

[next page]

Intro: Study about Board Games and Thinking

On behalf of our research team, thanks again for taking the time to participate in our research on
how people think about board games. Your answers to the questions in this survey and your
participation in the lab portion of the research will help us better understand how board games
play a role in everyday life.

In the following screens, you will be asked a series of questions about playing board games and
then some questions about you, personally. Please answer all questions honestly—there are no
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right or wrong answers—as they are important in understanding the types of people who are
participating in the research.

After the last section of questions, you will reach a page titled “Scheduling Your Research
Session,” with some instructions and a form for indicating your availability for an in-person
session in the Lab, as well as a request for your email address. Please read the instructions
carefully and indicate your availability for days and times you can come into the lab. You will be
asked to come into the lab for one of these days. Please note you will not be eligible to
participate in the second part of the research if you do not complete that scheduling form and
share your email address so we can contact you. Your email address will only be used for
scheduling and distributing gift cards, and will be deleted from all of our files at the end of data
collection.

Please click ‘next’ below to continue with the survey.

[next page]

Section 1/3: Board game experience

Thank you for taking our survey!
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We are interested in finding out a little bit about the board games you may have played. This
information allows us to get a general sense for the different kinds of games the people
participating in this research may have played.

If you haven’t played any of these games, that’s okay. Please read and respond to each statement
by selecting the answer that best represents your opinion. Just use your best judgment.

Consider the following list of board games. Using the slider, please indicate how experienced
you are with each game. If you have never played any of these games, that’s okay. Just leave the
sliders at 0.

•

7 Wonders [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Agricola [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Carcassonne [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Dominion [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Pandemic [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Power Grid [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Puerto Rico [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

The Settlers of Catan [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Small World [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

•

Ticket to Ride [slider: 0 = Never played, 10 = Expert]

[next page]
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Section 2/3 – A bit about you

Almost done! For this section, we would like to ask you some very basic demographic
information about yourself. This information allows us to get a general sense for the different
characteristics of people participating in this research.

● How old are you? [open]
● What is your gender? [open]
● What is your ethnicity? [open]
● What is your major? [open]
● How many years have you been in college? [open]

[next page]

Section 3/3 – Scheduling your research schedule

That’s it for this survey, but there’s still one more step …

In order to participate in the full research session, you must indicate your availability for days
and times to come in-person to the lab (located in Armstrong Hall at the downtown WVU
campus, room 115). In that session, you’ll be asked to play a board game with two-to-three other
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students, and then to do some writing and drawing to get at how you thought about the game.
This session will take between 1.5 to 2 hours.

But first, in order to contact you with a time for you to come to the lab, we need you to enter
your email address. Please note that if you do not complete this step, we will not be able to
confirm that you have completed the survey and you will not be able to participate in the
remainder of the study. After the study is complete, we will destroy all records of your email
address so nobody will be able to tell that you participated in the study.

Please enter your email address here: [open response]

[next page]

Please look over the following days and times, and check any that you are available for.
Remember that Spring Break is March 21-25, so make sure you will be in town those days if you
sign up for them! We will contact you as soon as possible to let you know the day and time you
are scheduled for.

9 a.m. – 11 a.m.
Saturday, March 5
Sunday, March 6
Saturday, March 12
Sunday, March 13
Saturday, March 19
Sunday, March 20

12 p.m. – 2 p.m.

3 p.m. – 5 p.m.
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That’s it! Thanks again for your participation in this study. We will email you as soon as possible
with your scheduled lab time and a few additional details.
[submit and exit survey]
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Appendix C: Consent Form

Only Minimal Risk
Consent Information Form (without HIPAA)
Principal Investigator
Department
Protocol Number
Study Title
Co-Investigator(s)

Jaime Banks, Ph.D.
Communication Studies
Understanding How Players Think about Board Games
Joe Wasserman, B.A.

Contact Persons
Jaime Banks, Ph.D. and Joe Wasserman, B.A.
In the event you experience any side effects or injury related to this research, you should
contact Dr. Banks (Assistant Professor, Communication Studies) at (304) 293-3905 or
jabanks@mail.wvu.edu. If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research,
you can contact Dr. Banks directly, or her co-investigator Mr. Wasserman (MA student,
Communication Studies) at (304) 293-3905. For information regarding your rights as a research
subject, to discuss problems, concerns, or suggestions related to the research, to obtain
information or offer input about the research, contact the Office of Research Integrity &
Compliance at (304) 293-7073.
In addition if you would like to discuss problems, concerns, have suggestions related to
research, or would like to offer input about the research, contact the Office of Research Integrity
and Compliance at 304-293-7073.

Introduction
You have been asked to participate in this research study, which has been explained to
you by Joe Wasserman. This study is being conducted by Dr. Jaime Banks and Mr. Joe
Wasserman in the Department of Communication Studies at West Virginia University in partial
fulfillment of Mr. Wasserman’s MA thesis. This project is not funded by any outside
organization.

Purpose(s) of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine how people think about board games.

Description of Procedures
In this study, you will be asked to learn and play a board game with two to three other
people. Then you will be asked to complete an activity related to how you thought about the
game that will involve writing and drawing. Playing the game will take no longer than 90
minutes. The activity afterward will take no longer than 30 minutes.

Discomforts
There are no known or expected risks from participating in this study, except for an
unlikely frustration associated with playing the board game and the activity afterward. If at any
time you feel uncomfortable in the study, you may request to leave study without any sort of
penalty. Your class and university standing will not be affected.

Benefits
You may not receive any direct benefit from this study. The knowledge gained from this
study may eventually benefit others.

Financial Considerations
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There are no special fees for participating in this study.

Confidentiality
Any information about you that is obtained as a result of your participation in this
research will be kept as confidential as legally possible. Your research records and test results,
just like hospital records, may be subpoenaed by court order or may be inspected by the study
sponsor or federal regulatory authorities without your additional consent. In any publications that
result from this research, neither your name nor any information from which you might be
identified will be published without your consent.

Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to withdraw your consent to
participate in this study at any time.
Refusal to participate or withdrawal will not affect your class standing or grades and will involve
no penalty to you.
In the event new information becomes available that may affect your willingness to
participate in this study, this information will be given to you so that you can make an informed
decision about whether or not to continue your participation.
You have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the research, and you have
received answers concerning areas you did not understand. Upon signing this form, you will
receive a copy.
I willingly consent to participate in this research.

Signatures
Signature of Subject
______________________________________________________________________________
Printed Name

Date

Time

______________________________________________________________________________
The participant has had the opportunity to have questions addressed. The participant willingly
agrees to be in the study.

Signature of Investigator or Co-Investigator
______________________________________________________________________________
Printed Name

Date

Time

______________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix D: Playmat
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Appendix E: Study Procedure Script
1. Prior to participant arrival at Armstrong Hall 115, all stimulus materials were set up
and covered on a table in the center of the room that had five chairs around it. Four
tables were arranged in the corners of the room with one chair for each. The materials
necessary for the first step of cognitive mapping—a pad of small sticky notes and a
medium-point marker—were set in the corner of these corner tables.
2. Each participant arrived at the study room in Armstrong Hall at his/her scheduled
time. The participant was greeted, and given an Informed Consent document to read
and consider. The key points of informed consent were reviewed verbally by the
researcher. They were asked if they have any questions about informed consent,
which the researcher will answer. They could grant consent by signing the document
and giving it to the investigator. Should a participant not wish to participate or grant
written consent, s/he were be told s/he may leave without penalty.
3. If consent was granted, the investigator read to the participant the following prompt:
“Thanks for agreeing to participate in my study. Over the next one-and-a-half to two
hours, I’m going to ask you to play a board game with two-to-three other students
and then do some writing and drawing to share how you thought about the game.
Please follow me into the room so you can get seated (while we wait for the other
participants/so we can get started).”
4. Participants were led into the room, which was equipped with a table in the center of
the room with five chairs, as well as tables in the four corners of the room with one
chair each. The game was setup on the center table, but covered until all participants
arrive.

117
5. Sessions were started no later than 10 minutes after the scheduled start time.
6. Once all participants arrived and were seated, or 10 minutes had elapsed since the
scheduled start time, the researcher read the following prompt: “As was discussed in
the consent document you just read, I’m conducting a research study on how people
think about board games. In just a moment, I’m going to uncover the game and ask
you to learn and play the game from the materials provided. I won’t be able to
answer questions about the game, as it’s important that you learn to play on your
own. I’ll let you know when you’ve completed 5 rounds to help you keep track of
them. Do you have any questions before we get started?” [Pause and address any
questions or concerns.]
7. Next, the researcher uncovered the game stimulus and read the following prompt:
“This is the game that you will be learning and playing. It is called ‘Dominion’ and
you all play as ‘medieval rulers’ trying to build your kingdom through different kinds
of cards. Please use this rulebook [points to the rulebook] and these materials to
learn how to play. The rulebook describes the rules, sample cards, and an example of
the first few turns. Feel free to read and discuss with each other, whatever works for
you. Whenever you are ready, you can start playing.”
8. The researcher seated himself in his chair placed at a slight distance from the table—
close enough to observe game events but far enough that he wouldn’t be seen as part
of gameplay. Throughout the gameplay session, he tracked the number of rounds that
participants played.
9. As participants learned and played the game, the researcher followed a strict set of
rules for behavior. He:
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•

Maintained a neutral facial expression the entire time.

•

Did not make eye contact with participants during gameplay unless directly
addressed by participants.

•

If participants ask the researcher about the game, he said, “I actually can’t answer
that question, since it might unfairly influence how you play the game. Everything
you need to know should be covered in the rulebook, so please check that for the
answer.”

•

If participants expressed discomfort about any aspect of the way the session was
proceeding, the researcher said, “You may leave at any time without penalties of
any sort, as described at the beginning of the session.”

10. Once 5 rounds had been played, the researcher said, “That’s the end of the fifth round,
so you’re halfway done.”
11. Once 10 rounds had been played, as described in the modified rulebook, the
researcher rang a bell and read the following, “Okay, it looks like you’ve completed
10 rounds. Please leave your cards here and sit at the table in the corner closest to
you. You’ll come back to the game before you leave, so you can leave the rest of your
things as well.”
12. Once participants were seated at the corner tables, the researcher read the following
script, “Great, now we’re interested in finding out how you thought about the game
you just played. I’m going to give you some written instructions that will guide you
through an activity designed to get at your thoughts about the game. Throughout this
process, go at your own pace and write whatever comes to your mind. There are no
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right or wrong answers, and no time limit. Before we begin, do you have any
questions?” [Pause and address any questions or concerns.]
13. The researcher then handed participants the written prompt for the first part of the
cognitive mapping task, which read, “We are interested in how you think about the
game you just played and what you think is important. When you think about the
game you just played, what are the things that come to your mind? Reflect on this
question for a moment, and then write each thing on a separate sticky note and set
them aside. Write as many as you’d like. Just make sure to note the things that you
thought were important while you were playing. Go at your own pace. It’s okay to
make any changes you want as you go along. Wave to the researcher when you feel
satisfied with what you have written.”
14. While participants worked on both this prompt and the next, the researcher quietly
organized participants’ cards both so that participants would be able to easily see
what cards they had acquired by the time the game was stopped, and to facilitate
recording of those cards once participants had left the study session. When finished,
the table was re-covered to prevent participants from individually viewing the cards.
At the same time, he watched for participants waving him over.
15. As participants waved over the researcher, he give them the materials for the next
step of cognitive mapping: a large blank piece of paper, a replacement pad of small
sticky notes in a slightly different color, and a flip book of prompts on several pages
that read:
1. Now we are interested in how you think the things you’ve just written relate to
each other. Essentially, you’re going to draw a diagram or a model of the game
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using your sticky notes. This booklet will ask you to do five different things related
to this. Please complete the task on each page before turning to the next. First,
reflect on how the things you’ve written down might be related to each other.
Then flip to the next page for the next step.
2. Now, arrange the sticky notes on the paper, placing related things near each
other. Be sure to leave some room in between them for the next step. As you do
this, feel free to edit, subtract, or add new sticky notes. When you are satisfied,
flip to the next page.
3. Now that your sticky notes are laid out, we are interested in how you think the
things on your sticky notes relate to each other. Please draw arrows connecting
your sticky notes to indicate the things that relate to each other. Feel free to
rearrange sticky notes as much as you’d like, add new things on new sticky notes,
and remove or alter anything you’ve already written—including erasing arrows.
Draw as many arrows as you please. When you are satisfied with the
arrangement of your sticky notes and the arrows you’ve drawn between them, flip
the page.
4. Now we’d like to know more about how you think the things you’ve written are
related to each other. Next to each arrow, please write a description of why the
two things connected by the arrow matter to each other. Write as much as you
think is necessary to describe their relationships. Feel free to add, remove, and
change both sticky notes and arrows while you do this. Then flip the page for the
last step.
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5. Finally, circle the part of your diagram that you think is most important. Wave to
the researcher when you are satisfied with all of your notes, arrows, and
descriptions.
16. As participants waved the researcher over, he quietly told them individually,
“Thanks. Please go back to your seat in the center. [If others have not yet finished:]
You may use your phone on silent if you like while the others finish.”
17. Once all participants finished and were seated at the center table, the researcher read
the following script: “That’s about all there is to it! Thank you all for time. Feel free
to take a look at the cards you all got, and to compare how many points you had at
the end of 10 rounds. So it looks like … you have [X] points so you were the winner of
the game. Congratulations! Before we wrap up, can I answer any questions at this
time?” [Pause and address any questions or concerns.]
18. After answering any potential questions, the researcher read the following script: “If
you don’t have any more questions for me, we’ll end the study session now. As we
wrap up, I do have one more favor to ask of you: as I’m still in the process of
collecting data, I would very much appreciate if you could not talk about the study
with anyone else. In particular, please do not tell people anything specific about the
game. You might have friends or classmates who have signed up for the study, and if
they knew about the details of the study ahead of time, it might change the way they
play the game or approach the questions. Once we finish data collection in April, it
will be okay to talk about the study then, and I will even be able to come in and tell
your class about the results.”
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19. The investigator then closed the study session: “With that, you have completed your
participation in this study. Thank you so much for your time.”
20. Once participants left, the researcher photographed participants’ cognitive maps.
Notecards that displayed the session date and time as well as the participants’
identification number were included in the photo to track which map and which cards
correspond to which participant. The researcher then reset the room for the next
session or, if it was the last session of the day, reverted the room to its normal
arrangement and collected all study materials.
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Appendix F: Anonymized Cognitive Maps

Cognitive map 1

Cognitive map 2
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Cognitive map 3

Cognitive map 4
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Cognitive map 5

Cognitive map 6
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Cognitive map 7
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Cognitive map 8

Cognitive map 9

128

Cognitive map 10

Cognitive map 11
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Cognitive map 12

Cognitive map 13
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Cognitive map 14

Cognitive map 15
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Cognitive map 16
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Cognitive map 17

Cognitive map 18
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Cognitive map 19

Cognitive map 20

134

Cognitive map 21
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Cognitive map 22

Cognitive map 23
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Cognitive map 24

Cognitive map 25
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Cognitive map 26

Cognitive map 27
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Cognitive map 28
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Cognitive map 29
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Cognitive map 30
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Appendix G: Codebook: Complex Relationship Variables
This codebook describes the coding rules for content analyzing cognitive maps of
systems for relationships between entities that are typical of complex systems. Specifically, in
this study this codebook is to be applied to cognitive maps of the analog game, Dominion.
Identifying the presence or absence of these relationships in cognitive maps of an analog game
will help to understand which kinds of relationships individuals find salient and include in their
mental models of systems without special training.
Coding involves identifying whether data match conceptualizations of these types of
relationships. As described in Design, Procedure, and Data Collection, pp. 26 – 31, data in this
dataset has several parts: a) descriptions of entities, b) arrows drawn between entities to indicate
relationships, and c) descriptions associated with these arrows to describe these relationships in
more detail.
First code the relationships between two descriptions of entities. These are tie-level
variables. To code this data, first read and fully understand the two descriptions of entities that
are being connected. Then, consider the direction of the arrow connecting these entities. Read
and fully understand the description of the relationship between the entities, taking into account
this arrow. The written description should take primacy over the direction of the arrow. Next,
consider how the two descriptions of entities are related in light of the arrow and relationship
description. Finally, considering the three tie-level variables, code 1 or 0 for presence or absence
of these three variables. Because each relationship may describe multiple of these relationships,
multiple tie-level variables may be coded 1.
After coding all tie-level variables, next code relationships that potentially include more
than two descriptions of entities. These are structure-level variables. Structure-level variables
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identify ties, described above, that are part of larger cognitive map structures. Examine the photo
of each cognitive map in turn. Use transcriptions as the final source for interpreting the writing in
these maps. Examine each tie within the cognitive map in turn to decide whether it may be a part
of one of the larger structures identified below under Structure-level Variables. Assess the first
structure-level variable (Indirect) before the second (Feedback). If it might be part of one of
these structures, examine the descriptions of entities, arrows, and descriptions of relationships—
as described above—for every tie that may be a part of these structures. Considering all of these,
code 1 or 0 for presence or absence of these two variables. Because each relationship may be a
part of multiple structures, multiple structure-level variables may be coded 1.
An important concept in the coding rules below involves semantic connection. Semantic
connection is based on what is written in descriptions of the relationships between entities, and is
the explicit reference to these entity descriptions within the relationship description.
Tie-level Variables
Tie-level variables are identified between two descriptions of entities connected by one
arrow. This data has been transcribed.
Variable 1: Unlabeled
Some relationships between descriptions of entities were indicated with an arrow, but
were not described. In this case, code a 1. If a relationship is coded as a 1 for this variable, do not
code it a 1 for any other variable.
When to use: Any undescribed relationship.
When not to use: If there is any description of the relationship, code 0.
1 = Unlabeled
0 = Labeled
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Variable 2: Stochastic
Stochastic relationships are relationships between entities that involve randomness
(Resnick & Wilensky, 1998). Because of randomness, stochastic relationships are nondeterministic. A given event, action, or input may yield a range of possible consequences,
outcomes, or outputs. Which outcome, the magnitude of the consequence, or the number of
outputs may potentially have a knowable—or potentially even fixed—probability distribution.
Stochastic relationships may be linear or nonlinear (see variable 4). Whereas linear/nonlinear
relationships have to do with changing input-output ratios, stochastic relationships have to do
with randomness.
When to use: Any mention of randomness, variable or multiple outcomes or
consequences, probability, or chance in a tie description should be coded 1. If randomness,
variable or multiple outcomes or consequences, probability, or chance are mentioned in an entity
description, code 1 if and only if some part of this description is semantically connected in the
link description. Otherwise, code 0. Example:

When not to use: Any relationship description that does not mention the above.
Descriptions of ordered events or outcomes, such as “first” or “second,” should be coded 0.
Conditional statements, such as “if a then b, but if x then y,” should be coded 0. When in doubt,
code 0. Example:
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1 = Stochastic relationship
0 = Non-stochastic relationship
Variable 3: Delayed
Delayed relationships are relationships that are separated temporally (Groesser &
Schaffernicht, 2012; Landriscina, 2013; Sweeney & Sterman, 2007). In a delayed relationship,
the consequence, outcome, or output of an event, action, or input occurs not instantly, but at
some later point in time. This time lapse is the central characteristic of delayed relationships.
When to use: Any relationship description that mentions the intervening time after an
event or input and before some outcome or output, including words that reference the passage of
time like “later.” If delay is described in a node, code 1 if and only if the node is semantically
connected in a tie description. Example:

When not to use: Any relationship that does not mention the above. Simply mentioning a
temporal order (e.g., “first,” “second,” “after”) is not enough to qualify as a delayed relationship.
When in doubt, code 0. Example:
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1= Delayed relationship
0 = Non-delayed relationship
Variable 4: Nonlinear
Nonlinear relationships are those in which outcomes are disproportional to the input
(Groesser & Schaffernicht, 2012; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004). In other words, the magnitude
of an outcome or the number of outputs changes at a different rate depending on the magnitude
of the event or input. Example of nonlinear relationships include exponential and logarithmic
relationships. Nonlinear relationships may be stochastic or deterministic (see variable 2).
Whereas stochastic relationships have to do with randomness, linear/nonlinear relationships have
to do with changing input-output ratios.
When to use: Any description of dis-proportional relationships in relationship
descriptions, including mentions of small inputs and large outputs or vice versa, should be coded
1. May be described in terms of proportions, comparisons of quantities/magnitudes, or words like
“more and less.” Some difference between magnitude of inputs and outputs (e.g., small input,
large output, or vice versa) must be stated or strongly implied. If this disproportionality is
mentioned in an entity description, the relationship should be coded 1 if and only if that
relationship description semantically connects to the entity description. Example:
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When not to use: Any relationship that does not mention the above. Simply mentioning a
magnitude or quantity—or even multiple magnitudes or quantities—does not qualify. When in
doubt, code 0. Example:

1 = Nonlinear relationship
0 = Non-nonlinear relationship
Structure-level Variables
Tie-level variables are those that cannot be identified by examining solely the
relationship between two descriptions of entities connected by one arrow. Instead, it requires
analyzing participants’ overall cognitive maps more holistically. Structure-level variables
incorporate more than one relationship between entities. Although this data has been transcribed,
photographs of these cognitive maps must be examined to identify these larger structures and
triangulate between the overall structure and the individual entities and relationships that
comprise it.
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Variable 5: Indirect
Indirect relationships are those in which an entity influences another entity via at least
one other. Instead of A directly influencing B, A influences X, and X influences B.
When to use: In order for 3+ entities to be indirectly related, the relationships between A
-> X must be semantically connected, and the relationship between X -> B must be semantically
connected. Moreover, these relationships must be directional and in the same direction, such that
A influences X and X influences B. The direction of relationships described by text takes
primacy over the direction of relationships implied by arrow directions. The same rules apply to
indirect relationships that involve more than 3 entities, because they are all composed of 3-entity
indirect relationships. Indirect relationships that begin and end with the same entity should be
coded 1; for example, A -> X -> A. Example:

When not to use: Multiple entity descriptions merely connected by a series of arrows
does not qualify—entities must be semantically connected in the relationship description.
Additionally, two entities influencing the same entity does not count (A -> X <- B). When in
doubt, code 0. Example:
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Variable 6: Feedback
Feedback loops involve an entity influencing itself (Eden et al., 1992; Groesser &
Schaffernicht, 2012; Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006; Landriscina, 2013). An entity may directly
influence itself. An entity may also influence itself indirectly (see variable 5). The direction of
relationships described by text takes primacy over the direction of relationships implied by arrow
directions.
When to use: To count as a feedback loop, the all entities must be semantically connected
via relationship descriptions, and the direction of these relationships must be able to be traced
away from an entity description and then back to the same entity description. The direction of
relationships described by text takes primacy over the direction of relationships implied by arrow
directions. Feedback loops may include only one entity that influences itself, two entities that
influence each other, or 3+ entities that indirectly influence each other. Relationships may be
coded 1 for both Indirect and Feedback. For potential feedback loops that include 3+ entities, the
full rules in Indirect must also be followed. Example:
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When not to use: A loop of entities merely connected by a series of arrows does not
qualify—semantic or logical relationships linking them must be present. Relationships that are
not in the same direction should be coded as 0; for example, A -> X <- B -> A should be coded
0. When in doubt, code 0. Example:
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Other Variables
Do not code for these variables during the regular coding process. These variables will be
assigned after regular coding.
Variable 7: Simple
Relationships between entities can be simpler than any of the complex relationships
described above. Often, individuals perceive or conceive of relationships as simple—direct,
linear, immediate, and deterministic—even when they are not (Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006;
Penner, 2000; Resnick, 1996; Resnick & Wilensky, 1998; Sweeney & Sterman, 2007). These
simple relationships are the complete absence of the complex relationships described above.
When to use: If variables 1 – 6 are 0, code 1.
When not to use: If one or more of variables 1 – 6 are 1, code 0.
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